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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
DWIGHT L. KING, Administrator of 
the Estate of JOHN T. TOOMER, 
Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant anr]j App,ellant. 
'Case No. 
7472 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties will be designated on appeal herein the 
same as they were designated in the trial court. 
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Dwight L. King, as Administrator of the Estate of 
John T. Toomer, Deceased, filed this action in the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake 
County, Utah, for and on behalf of Ida D. Toomer, widow, 
and John J. Toomer, son, the surviving heirs of John T. 
Toomer, deceased. The action was brought to recover dam-
ages for the death of John T. Toomer, who was instantly 
killed in a crossing accident when a 1946 half-ton Chevrolet 
pickup truck, which he was driving, came into collision with 
defendant's Streamliner passenger train on what is known 
as First Street crossing, which is the main street crossing 
in Cokeville, Wyoming, on May 1, 1948. The truck being 
driven by Toomer was owned by the Cokeville Land & Live-
stock Company, Toomer's employer, and that company as-
signed its interest and claim for damages with respect to 
said truck to the plaintiff herein, and damages are also 
sought by this action for the value of said truck. 
The negligence charged against defendant by plain-
tiff as a basis of said action was that the defendant was 
operating its Streamliner passenger train at a high rate 
of speed in excess of the 30 miles per hour speed limit pro-
vided by ordinance in Cokeville, Wyoming; that the defend-
, ant obstructed the view of the deceased with respect to such 
approaching Streamliner train by a freight train standing 
on a passing track; and that defendant failed to have a 
flagman or other employe at the crossing to warn approach-
ing motorists (R. 20). 
Defendant denied the charges of negligence and al-
leged that the accident was due to the negligence of the 
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deceased, John T. Toomer, ooth upon the basis that the 
negligence of said deceased was the sole proximate cause 
of the accident, and that such negligence contributed to 
cause the same so as to bar plaintiff from any right of 
action herein. 
At the conclusion of the evidence defendant moved for 
a directed verdict (R. 378, 381). The court denied the 
motion and submitted the case to a jury which returned a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
John T. Toomer and his family lived 1n a company 
house· owned by the Cokeville Land & Livestock Company, 
his employer, which house was located immediately to the 
west of the defendant railroad company's tracks and right 
of way, some distance to the north of where said railroad 
tracks pass over First Street, or the main street, in Coke-
ville, Wyoming (R. 205). The deceased and his family· 
had resided in this same house for approximately 10 years 
(R. 211). He was familiar with the crossing, having passed 
over it numerous times during the 10 years, if not daily, 
and he knew that the defendant railroad company's Stream-
liner passenger train passed through Cokeville sometime 
d.uring the afternoon of each day (R. 212). First Street 
runs east and west and the railroad tracks cross it ap-
proximately north and south. On May 1, 1948 Mr. Toomer 
came home from work, got into the pickup truck, and drove 
southward from his home on a roadway paralleling the 
railroad tracks, south to First Street, going to the main 
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· part of town east of the tracks in Cokeville to get some family 
groceries (R. 207). 
At and over the First Street crossing, the defendant 
company maintained four separate tracks (Exhibit 1). The 
two westerly tracks were designated as and known as pass-
ing tracks ( R. 107-R. 2) . The next or third track from the 
west was the def~ndant company's single main line track. 
A fourth track farther east was known as a siding or house 
track. From the east rail of the west passing track to the 
west rail of the second passing track, measured at right 
angles, there was a distance of 8 feet 2112 inches. From the 
I 
east rail of the second passing track to the west rail of the 
~ 
main line track, measured at right angles, there was a 
distance of 10 feet 31/2 inches (R. 348, 352). Between the 
main line track and the house track to the east there was 
a distance of 48 feet. These distances were measured at 
right angles, whereas First Street itself as it crosses the 
tracks crosses at a slight variance from a right angle, as 
will be shown by the map, Exhibit 1, which was introduced 
into evidence upon stipulation of counsel at pretrial, and 
which is drawn to a scale of one inch to 20 feet. At the 
crossing, immediately to the west of the westerly track and 
I 
to the east of the easterly of the four tracks on the south 
side of First Street, is a standard railroad crossbuck sign 
(Exhibits 1 and G) . Immediately to the east of the main 
line track and on the south side of First Street is located an 
automatic wigwag crossing signal, which crossing signal 
consists of a disk about 24 inches in diameter, with a red 
light about six inches in diameter in the center thereof (R. 
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339). When this signal is in operation the disk wigwags or 
swings back-and-forth, the red light in the center is lighted, 
and a bell on the mechanism rings. 
As Mr. Toomer approached the crossing on May 1, 
there was one of defendant's freight trains, headed north, 
standing on the middle of the three west tracks. on the 
passing track just west of the main line, the front of the 
engine, as stated by various of plaintiff's witnesses, being 
30 (R. 108), 40 (R. 115) or 50 feet (R. 130) south of the 
crossing, and according to Mr. Harmon, son-in-law of de-
ceased and one of plaintiff's witnesses, 32 feet south of the 
end of the planking as measured by him according to his 
best recollection of where the engine stood, although 
measured sometime after the accident and after the train 
had moved (R. 185). Defendant's witnesses testified that 
the front of the engine was considerably farther to the· 
south down in front of the depot and freight warehouse, and 
that the freight started to move as the passenger train ap-
proached and after the accident came to a stop where the 
front of the engine then was some 75 to 100 feet south of· 
the crossing (R. 217, 221). 
There is no claim by plaintiff that the defendant did 
not sound the whistle or bell on the Streamliner passeng~r 
train, and various witnesses, both those produced by plain-
tiff and defendant, testified that numerous whistles were 
sounded on the Streamliner (R. 136, 146-147, 165, 249-
250, 222, 341). Defendant's witnesses testified the bell 
on the Streamliner was ringing (R. 27 4-275, 297-298), 
and no witness testified to the contrary. Some of plahi-
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tiff's witnesses and most of defendant's witnesses testi-
fied that the wigwag at the crossing was in operation, 
swinging back-and-forth, with the light on and the wig-
wag bell ringing (R. 136-137, 220-221, 252, 270-271, 310, 
Exhibit 2). Those who did not so testify made no observa-
tion from which they could state one way or the other, and 
it was not disputed by plaintiff that the, wigwag was in 
actual and proper operation during all of the time involved 
immediately preceding the a.ccident and for some little time 
thereafter. The wigwag signal was activated and operated 
only by approaching trains on the main line track, the 
contact point which would start the signal operating being 
1650 feet south of the crossing (R. 338). The wigwag 
signal was never activated or caused to operate by trains on 
either of the passing tracks or on the house track to the 
east, and never had been connected up so that it would 
operate or be operated by trains on any track other than the 
main line track ( R. 338-339) . 
Trains passed in Cokeville at various times, and the 
two tracks west of the main line track were designated as 
passing tracks and were known by residents in Cokeville 
as passing tracks (R. 133-134, 107). At the time of the 
accident there was no flagman at the crossing but the 
wigwag was in operation as stated above. 
The day was stormy, and while one or two of plain-
tiff's witnesses thought it was snowing at the time, others 
of plaintiff's witnesses and all of defendant's witnesses 
stated that it had been snowing but at the time of the ac-
cident the snow had ceased and sometime later it started 
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to snow again (R. 109, 114, 121, 127, 137, 155, 162, 163, 239, 
252, 280, 298) . Being a spring storm the snow came in 
large flakes but was not enough to lie on the ground (R. 
112). According to Toomer's son-in-law Harmon, in spite 
of the storm, visibility was good at least for 200 yards (R. 
188). 
Plaintiff's witnesses were able to observe the train 
and the approaching truck of the deceased for considerable 
distance from the track, and the fireman and engineer on 
the Streamliner train were able to observe the order board 
approximately a mile from the depot (R. 280-281, 298). 
Plaintiff's witness S. C. Curtis was 5 or 6 blocks away, 
coming from the east end of town and traveling in a west-
erly direction, and he watc~ed both the Streamliner and 
the truck in 'vhich deceased was riding for some little time 
as they approached the crossing (R. 146-147). Plaintiff's 
witness Eldon Dayton was a block or more east of the cross-
ing, traveling west, and he saw the Streamliner approach-
ing and heard the whistle (R. 136). 
As the deceased, John T. Toomer, approached the 
crossing, traveling southward from his home, he was travel-
ing 25 or 30 miles an hour (R. 221, 277-278, 301-302, 319). 
The windows on his truck were up and he did not slacken 
speed or stop at any time (R. 320, 278, 301, 319, 329, 330). 
He turned onto First Street and traveled eastward over the 
crossing at approximately 30 miles an hour up until the 
moment when the center of his truck and the left front. of 
the diesel engine on the Streamliner came into collision at 
the crossing. The Streamliner was travelng in a northerly 
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direction. Apparently Toomer was killed instantly, being 
thrown from his truck at the impact, and the truck was 
fastened onto the left side of the front portion of the diesel 
engine and carried a distance of a pp~oximately 1600 feet 
to the north, where the Streamliner came to rest. The 
emergency brakes were not applied on the Streamliner 
engine, the railroad employes testifying that -at the speed 
the deceased was moving and the distance between the 
train and the truck when they first saw the truck, any 
emergency application of the brakes. would be unavailing as 
far as the accident was concerned and could have done noth-
ing except to upset and possibly injure passengers on the 
Streamliner ( R. 278-279) . 
One or two of plaintiff's witnesses testified that the 
train was going in the neighbor hood of 50 miles an hour 
a~d others could not give a fair estimate of the speed of the 
train (R. 128, 145) ; while defendant's witnesses testified 
that the train was going about 30 miles an hour at the time 
of the impact, but faster than that prior to the impact (R. 
223, 276-277, 290-291, 300). The engineer testified that the 
speedometer on the train showed 33 miles an hour as he 
passed the depot building, and the train was slowing down 
at the time, so that in his opinion it was going approxi-
mately 30 miles an hour at the moment of impact (R. 291). 
There were none of plaintiff's witnesses able to give 
any evidence as to the speed at which the deceased was 
traveling in his truck and therefore the testimony of defend-
ant's witnesses that he was traveling 25 to 30 miles an hour 
stands undisputed in the record. 
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The only evidence as to the movements of the deceased, 
except from the witness Curtis, who saw him approaching 
and concluded there was going to be a collision with the 
train (R. 146), came from defendant's witnesses who stated 
that the deceased, John T. Toomer, never at any time slowed 
down or stopped prior to passing over the tracks at the 
crossing, in spite of the fact that the wigwag was in oper-
ation (R. 221, 250-252, 278, 301). The witness Curtis ob-
served him for some little time and concluded there was 
going to be a collision between the train and the truck, 
but during the time of his observation Curtis, who was 
plaintiff's witness, stated that the truck never stopped or 
slowed down (R. 147). 
No statutes or other laws of the State of Wyoming or 
of the Town of Cokeville were pleaded or put in evidence 
other than the ordinance limiting speed of trains to 30 miles 
per hour, and therefore there is nothing in the record to 
show that the law of Wyoming is in any respect different 
from the laws of Utah as applied to circumstances surround-
ing this accident other than the one ordinance setting the 
speed limit of trains at 30 miles per hour .. 
There was no charge in the pleadings and no issue 
raised thereby with respect to the crossing being extra 
hazardous in any respect, and there was no evidence given 
at the trial that would show or tend to show that the cross-
ing was such as to require any additional or extra precau-
tions to be taken by the defendant railroad company. 
Some few facts in addition to those hereinabove stated 
will be referred to in argument, and particularly more de-
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tail concerning facts as hereinabove stated will be pointed 
out during the course of the argument. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS COMMITTED BY 
THE TRIAL COURT AND POINTS UPON 
WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY 
FOR REVERSAL. 
1. The trial court erred in denying and overruling 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict as made at the 
conclusion of all the evidence. 
2. The trial court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 1. 
3. The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 10, 
and particularly subparagraph (b) of paragraph (1) there-
of. 
4. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (c) 
of paragraph (1) of Instruction No. 10. 
5. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (b) 
of paragraph (2) of Instruction No. 23. 
6. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (c) 
of paragraph (2) of Instruction No. 23. 
7. The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 12. 
8. The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 13. 
9. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (f) 
of Instruction No. 13. 
10. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (g) 
of Instruction No. 13. 
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11. The trial court erred in giving· subparagraph (h) 
of Instruction No. 13. 
12. The trial court erred in giving subparagraph (i) 
of Instruction No. 13. 
13. The trial court erred in giving the concluding 
paragraph of Instruction No. 13. 
14. The trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 
15, and particularly that portion of No. 15 stating: "There 
is a presumption that at and prior to the time of the col-
lision that the said Toomer was exercising ordinary care 
for his own protection." 
15. The trial court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 4. 
16. The trial court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 5. 
17. The trial court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 15. 
18. The trial court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 16. 
19. The trial court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 21. 
20. The trial court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 23. 
21. The trial court erred in refusing to give defend-
ant's requested Instruction No. 25. 
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22. The trial court erred in refusing to grant de-
fendant's motion for new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSI-
BLE ERROR IN OVERRULING AND DENY-
ING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECT-
ED VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF ALL 
OF THE EVIDENCE AND IN REFUSING TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TION NO. 1. (Statement of Errors 1 and 2). 
The accident upon which this suit was brought hap-
pened in the State of Wyoming, and in spite of that fact 
and the fact that suit was brought thereon within the State 
of Utah, the plaintiff did not plead any statutes of the State 
of Wyoming or ordinances of the City of Cokeville to show 
that the Wyoming law was different in any respect from 
the Utah law, except with respect to the one instance where 
the ordinance of Cokeville was pleaded and admitted which 
set a speed limit of 30 miles an hour for trains moving 
through Cokeville. It is a general rule followed by most 
jurisdictions and_ established and reaffirmed by this court 
in numerous cases that where the laws of a foreign state 
are not pleaded or offered in evidence, our courts, including 
the Supreme Court, must conclude that the laws of such 
state are the same as those of the forum. 
In the case of Dickson v. Mullings, 66 Utah 282, 241 
P. 840, a surety company which had given bond in the 
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State of New York was involved in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing brought in the State of Utah after the criminal, who 
had violated his bond, was found within the State of Utah. 
In that case this court held : 
"Whether the state of New York has a statute 
on the subject is not shown. No such or any statute 
of New York is either pleaded or proved. It, of 
course, is well settled that state courts cannot take 
judicial notice of laws or statutes of a sister state. 
It also is well settled in this jurisdiction (Cases 
.. cited) that, in the absence of proof, it will be pre-
sumed that the law of another state is the same as 
the law of the forum and the cou'rt will administer 
and apply the law of the jurisdiction until the law 
of the situs is shown. Thus, in the absence of proof, 
it will be presumed that the law of New York on the 
subject is the same as the law of Utah." 
In the case of Whitmore Oxygen Co. v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, ... Utah ... , 196 P. 2d 976, it was held that 
the statutes of a sister state would be presumed to be the 
same as Utah statutes where the statutes of the sister state 
were not pleaded or proved. 
See also: 
Buhler v. Maddison, 105 Utah 39, 140 P. 2d 
933. 
United .A.ir Lines Transport Co~. v. Industrial 
Commission, 107 Utah 52, 151 P. 2d 591. 
Gillespie v. Blood, 81 Utah 3.06, 17 P. 2d 822. 
Smith v. Smith, 77 Utah 60, 291 P. 298. 
McGarry v. Industrial Commission, 63 Utah 81, 
222 P. 592. 
Grow v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 44 Utah 160, 138 P. 398. 
Stanford v. Gray, 42 Utah 228, 129 P·. 423. 
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At the time of the accident in question the laws. of 
Utah provided as follows.: 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, Section 57-7-159. 
"Whenever any person driving a vehicle ap. 
proaches a railroad grade crossing, the driver of 
such vehicle shall stop within 50 feet but not less 
than 10 feet from the nearest track of such railroad 
and shall not proceed until he can do so safely when: 
"(a) A clearly visible electric or mechanical 
signal device gives warning of the immediate ap-
proach of a train. 
"(b) A crossing gate is lowered, or when a 
human flagman gives or continues to give a signal 
of' the approach or passage of a train. 
"(c) A railroad train approaching within ap. 
proximately 1,500 feet of the highway crossing emits 
a signal audible from such distance· and such train 
by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing is 
an immediate hazard. 
''(d) An approaching train is plainly visible 
and is in hazardous proximity to such crossing." 
Section 57-7-224, which is a part of the same enact-
ment, reads : 
"It is a misdemeanor for any person to violate 
any of the provisions of this. act, unless such viola-
tion is by this act or other law of this state declared 
to be a felony." 
Thus the law which wo~ld be applicable to the accident 
involved in this case required that any or every person 
when approaching a railroad crossing in a vehicle "shall 
stop within 50 feet but not less than 10 feet from the near-
est track of such railroad and shall not proceed until he 
can do so safely when: (a) A clearly visible electric or me-
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chanica} signal device gives warning of the immediate ap-
proach of a train. * * *" 
In his complaint the plaintiff said nothing about the· 
existence or operation of a mechanical warning signal at 
the crossing but did charge the defendant with negligence 
for failure to station a flagman at the crossing to warn 
travelers. At the trial, however, the evidence, without dis-
I 
pute, showed that there was a mechanical wigwag signal 
at the crossing near the main line track, with a wigwag arm 
containing a disk 24 inches in diameter with a 6 inch red 
light in the center thereof, and a bell attached to said 
mechanism, and that at all times surrounding the occur-
rence of the accident the wigwag was in operation, swing-
ing back-and-forth, the light in the center of the wigwag 
was on red, and the bell mechanism in connection with the 
wigwag signal was ringing. The only witnesses who testi-
fied with respect to such signal confirmed the fact of its 
operation, and nowhere in the pleadings, evidence, or argu-
ment did the plaintiff attempt to dispute the fact that such 
signal was in proper operation at the time. 
The evidence conclusively and affirmatively shows 
that the deceased, John T. Toomer, as he approached this 
crossing approached it at a speed between 25 and 30 miles 
an hour; that he never at any time slowed down or came 
to a stop, but without slackening his speed drove over the 
crossing in the face of the operating mechanical signal and 
into the collision with defendant's Streamliner passenger 
train. 
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At this point we should like to refer to the testimony. 
Plaintiff's witness S. C. Curtis, who was 5 or 6 blocks east 
of the crossing on First Street (R. 147), testified (R. 145-
147): 
"A. Well, I was considerable distance away 
and I saw this car coming, but the Streamliner- ·.·.·. 
they came immediately onto the crossing together, 
* * *" 
With respect to the truck he said: 
"A. Well, I just saw it coming. 
"Q. Which way was it coming? 
"A. It was coming east. 
"Q. Did you see it when it turned from a 
southerly direction, to turn east? 
"A. No, I didn't see it when it turned. 
"Q. How long did you watch him? 
"A. Well, I was pretty much concerned about 
the way they were coming, so close together. 
"Q. ·C'ould you see the Streamliner before it 
arrived at the street here? 
* * * * • 
"A. I watched it off and on all the way up, 
coming up the track. 
* * * * * 
''Q. Now getting back to this truck, when 
you first saw him he was coming east on First 
Street? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And about how long did you observe him, 
would you say? 
"A. Well, I was driving along and I was watch-
ing the road, and other things·, and I just happened 
to see him momentarily when he first came into my 
vision. 
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"Q. Did you ever see him stop? 
"A. No, I never saw him stop." 
The witness Charles Mackey testified that he say 
Toomer coming south on the roadway to the west of and 
paralleling th~ tracks (R. 319, 320, 329-330) : 
"Q. Can you give us - When Mr. Toomer 
passed you can you give us an opinion as to how 
fast he was· going? 
"A. I would say 25, 30 miles an hour. 
* * * * * 
"Q. Did you ever at any time, from the time 
he passed up by the toolhouses, until he got to the 
crossing, see him slow down? 
"A N . 
. o, sir. 
"Q. Did you observe anything with respect to 
what he did, one way or the other? 
"A. The only thing I know, he kept going, and 
he hadn't stopped until he hit the train, that is all. 
* * * * * 
"Q. When you saw Mr. Toomer is. that where 
you say he was going 25 or 30 miles an hour? 
"A. y . es, sir. 
"Q. You didn't see him any more after that, 
did you? 
"A. I could see him until he hit the crossing. 
* * * * * 
"Q. Did you watch Mr. Toomer at all? 
"A. I turned just as he hit the crossing." 
The witness ~aylor, engineer on the freight, testified 
(R.221): 
"Q. Did you observe the truck before he was 
hit? 
"A. y es. 
* * * * * 
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"A. I estimate his speed at about 30 miles, 
approximately 30 miles as he crossed over the cross-
ing. 
"Q. · Did you ever, at any time, see him stop? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Did you see him slow down? 
"A. No." 
The same witness testified with respect to the point 
whe~:"e he first saw Toomer's truck (R. 228-229): 
"A. Well, I could, I believe I could see that 
automobile when it hit the-when it came on the 
rail, the west side of that passing track. 
* * * * * 
"A.. The first I saw was at about the time it 
came over the west rail of the track I was standing 
on." 
The witness Earl Wilcox testified that he was on the 
west side of the standing freight engine, and he saw first 
the Cozzens car or sedan and then. Toomer's truck go by 
(R. 249). Wilcox testified (R. 250) : 
"Q. Would you say he was going slow or fast, 
or what? 
"A. He was going fast, yes." 
In response to a question as to whether the truck 
stopped the witness stated that Toomer couldn't have stop-
ped, and upon counsel's motion that answer was stricken, 
but later on (R. 251), the court overruled the objection to 
the following question and it was answered as follows : 
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"Q. And should he have stopped at any time 
west of those tracks, would you have seen him? 
"A. That is right." 
The witness Reed, engineer of the Streamliner, testi-
fied ( R. 277-278) : 
"A. The next I seen was a truck come from the 
west and was just coming on to the passing track 
as I was coming up the road crossing. 
* * * * * 
"A. * * * I think he was just coming up 
to what we term as the eastbound passing track. 
"Q. That is the furthest west of the three? 
"A. It is the outside passing track. 
* * * * * 
"A. Well, I would say he was going just about 
the same speed I was, 30 miles an hour, * * * 
* * * * * 
"Q. During the time after you first saw him 
until he got right on the main line ahead of you did 
he ever, at any time, slow down with his truck? 
"A. N . o, sir. 
* * * * 
"Q. Did he slow down at all? 
"A. No, sir." 
* 
Vernon A. Wilcox, fireman on the Streamliner, testified 
(R. 301-302) : 
"Q. Where was the truck when you first saw 
it? 
"A. It was about 50 or 60 feet from us. 
"Q. And where with reference to those tracks 
would you say it would be? 
"A. I would say it was about 10 feet the other 
side of the outside of the west passing. 
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"Q. To the west of the west passing track? 
And can you give us an opinion as to about how fast 
the truck was going? 
"A. He was going about the same speed we 
were. That was about the same speed, distance from 
the main line as we were from the crossing there. 
"Q. About the same distance? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you met right at the crossing? 
"A.. That is right. 
"Q. As he came across those tracks. and up to 
the crossing, did he slow down at all? 
"A. He didn't slow down." 
The witness Sparks. walked across the crossing, and 
after crossing the main line turned around and watched 
the Streamliner, but never did see Toomer until just at the 
moment of impact (R. 310). 
It is true that none of the witnesses could testify that 
they were watching Mr. Toomer all of the time from the time 
he left his home until the accident, but various ones saw 
him at various times during his journey toward the crossing, 
and not one of them-either of plaintiff's or defendant's 
witnesses-at any time saw him slow down or stop. If he 
had slowed down or stopped the witness Mackey would 
have known it. If he had slowed down or stopped at any 
time he could not possibly have been going the 25 or 30 miles 
per hour, which was his undisputed speed, at a point to the 
west of the west passing track when the fireman and en-
gineer of the Streamliner first saw him, as was stated by the 
fireman on the standing freight train, Earl E. Wilcox. 
Under the circumstances, he co:uld not pos.sibly have 
stopped in his progress toward the track or some one of the 
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there, rather than, as the fireman and the engineer of the 
Streamliner testified, that he was proceeding at 30 miles 
an hour at some point at least 10 feet west of the west pass-
ing track and continued at that same rate of speed without 
slowing or stopping until the collision, and this in spite 
of all of the signals being given at the time. 
The action of the deceased, John T. Toomer, in so at-
tempting to pass over the crossing in the face of such warn-
ing was in direct violation of the laws above quoted and 
as such constituted negligence on his part as a matter of 
law. The trial court should have so held and should have 
granted the defendant's motion for directed verdict upon 
the basis that the deceased was guilty of contributory 
negligence--if not guilty of negligence constituting th~ sole 
proximate cause of the accident. 
There have been a number of cases before our Utah 
courts involving a situation where a mechanical warning 
signal has been located at a crossing, but at the time of the 
accident in question it has been found that the signal was 
not operating as it should, and this court on several oc-
casions has held that even under such circumstances where 
a mechanical signal has been located at the crossing but 
fails to operate and give warning as it should, nevertheless 
a traveler on the highway is not entitled to place entire re-
liance upon such signal or upon the failure of the signal to 
activate, but must still exercise reasonable care in looking 
and listening for trains which may be approaching. If that 
is true, what should be the situation when a mechanical 
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signal is located at a crossing and admittedly is operating 
properly, but a traveler attempts to pass over the crossing 
in face of such warning and is injured and killed? 
We have been unable to find where such a question 
has heretofore been presented to this court, and therefore 
the question as it is involved in this case is, in our opinion, 
one of first impression here. However, the statute as above 
referred to is a uniform statute, and either in identical terms 
or in very similar terms has. been in force in other j urisdic-
tions and cases involving the failure of such a driver to pay 
proper heed to such a mechanical warning have reached 
the highest courts of many of our sister states. Counsel for 
appellant herein have made a search of cases, and while 
we do not necessarily contend that the cases found con-
stitute all of the cases upon such subject, we have found 
no case involving such facts wherein a court has held that 
such a driver is not guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. The cases seem to be unanimous in holding 
that such conduct does amount to negligence as a matter 
of law. Particularly is that true where the statute, as is 
the case with our statute, provides a misdemeanor or other 
criminal penalty where there is a violation of such statutory 
provision. 
In the case of Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Folger, 170 F. 
2d 238, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit had before it similar question involving an Ohio 
statute which provided: 
"No person shall drive a vehicle across a rail-
road grade crossing when : 
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" (a) A clearly visible electric or mechanical 
signal device gives warning of the immediate ap-
proach of a train * * *." 
In that case there were four sets of railroad tracks 
extending over the crossing and flasher light. signals were 
located at the crossing. As Folger approached the crossing 
a freight train was standing on a side track with the front 
end of the engine some 250 feet or 300 feet east of the high-
way. An eyewitness testified that Folger did slow down 
but did not stop his automobile and continued across the 
crossing and was struck and killed by a passenger train. 
The question of the extent of view that Folger may have 
had was not discussed. It appeared that the accident hap-
pened at approximately midnight. However the Federal 
Court disposed of the case rather summarily, stating as 
follows: 
"Here the uncontradicted evidence shows that 
flasher lights were in operation during the entire 
period of the accident. The locomotive was some 
490 feet west of the crossing, going 70 miles. an 
hour at the time the automobile was some 70 feet 
from the track. The all-important fact is that the 
passenger train was within the circuit of the flasher 
light, which is conceded to be 3387 feet west of the 
crossing, as the decedent drove up to the tracks. 
* * * 
"We deem it unnecessary to discus'S' the question 
of physical obstructions on the right of way and the 
layout of the tracks, because in our view· one propo-
sition is determina.tive, namely, that the evidence, 
when considered in the light most favorable to the 
appellee, establishes as a matter of law that the de-
cedent was guilty of contributory neg·ligence which 
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proximately contriquted to cause his death. It is 
uncontradicted on this record that tke de·c·edent drooe 
across the crossing in violation of statute, and tk~ 
was guilty ot·negligence per s·e." (Italics ours.) 
It appeared in that case, different from what the evi-
dence shows in the case at bar, that the freight train on the 
side track may also have activated the flasher signal, but 
with respect to that the Federal Appellate Court stated: 
"* * * The fact that the flasher light was 
also giving warning of the presence of the standing 
freight train does not affect the determinative im-
portance of the circumstance that the decedent had 
warning of the approach of ·the pa~senger train. 
·"Under these conceded facts, the case tfalls 
squarely within the ambit of Section 6307-60, Gen-
eral Code of Ohio. Driving across the grade crossing 
under these circumstances was negligence per se, 
· under long-established Ohio law. ('Cases cited.)" 
In that case the trial court had submitted the matter 
to a jury and a verdict had been rendered for the plaintiff, 
but the appellate court concluded: 
"The judgment is reversed and the case is re-
manded with instructions to enter judgment for the 
appellant.'' 
Brown v. Pennsy.lvania R. Co., (Ohio) 61 N. E. 2d 163, 
is a case in which plaintiff as she approached a railroad 
crossing, and some distance from the tracks, saw flasher 
lights flashing at the crossing. She stopped a short dis-
tance from the crossing, waited some little time, and as no 
train approached, she put her car in low gear, started over 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the tracks, and got up to a speed of about 10 miles an hour. 
As she got onto the tracks the motor in her car stalled and 
she then saw a train approaching. The trial court sub-
mitted the matter to a jury, which returned a verdict for the 
plaintiff. The court of appeals stated that the trial court 
should have directed a verdict, and in reversing the trial 
court stated : 
~'It is not necessary to discuss the issue of the 
defendant's negligence raised by the pleadings and 
evidence, since the evidence on that issue was con-
flicting and the jury was justified in finding that 
certain acts of negligence were committed by the 
defendant. The chief legal question, as we see it, is 
whether the undisputed evidence discloses that the 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law. 
* * * * * 
"The record discloses that when she was ap-
proaching the railroad crossing, Elizabeth Brown 
saw the automatic signals flashing. She stopped at 
the track because they were flashing. She did not 
see a train but other automobiles were crossing the 
tracks, so she drove on the crossing and her car 
stalled there. She says that she did not see the lights 
flashing just as she drove upon the tracks, but yet 
there is undisputed evidence that they were in good 
condition; that they had been flashing a short time 
before the accident, and they were also flashing 
after the accident, and it can reasonably be p-re-
sumed that they were flashing when she drove upon 
the crossing .. She did not see the lights flashing as 
she started to cross the tracks, but she does not say 
that she looked at the lights at this time. We feel 
that it can be reasonably presumed that since she 
was intent upon looking for a train, that she did not 
look just before she started over the tracks to see 
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if they were flashing at that time. The rule, we 
think, is well established in Ohio, that one who 
drives his automobile on a railroad crossing disre-
garding the watchman with a stop sign, or a bell, 
or flashing signals, is guilty of contributory negli ... 
gence as a matter of law, when struck by an oncom-
ing train." 
In the case of Byerly v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. et al., 
(Wash.) 120 P. 2d 453, the Washington statute provided 
f 
that a person operating a vehicle as involved in the case 
should stop within 50 feet but not less than 20 feet, and 
"not p,roceed until he can do so safely. The operator of any 
vehicle shall stop his vehicle and remain standing and not 
, traverse any railroad grade crossing * * * when a 
* * * mechanical or electric signal gives or continues 
to give a signal of the approach or passage of any train 
* * *." Byerley was driving a truck and approached and 
attempted to pass over a crossing which was protected by a 
mechanical wigwag signal. It was not contended that the 
wigwag signal was not working, or that the signal bell at-
tached to it was not ringing, but it was contended that the 
signal was so located that it was not clearly visible and that 
the signal bell was not loud enough to be audible to one 
approaching in a truck. The trial court submitted the mat-
ter to a jury, which returned a verdict for plaintiff, but the 
Supreme Court of Washington reversed the trial court with 
instructions to enter a judgment dismissing the action. 
The Washington Supreme Court stated: 
"We are clearly of the opinion that the testi-
mony is conclusive that at the time of the accident, 
the wigwag signal was clearly visible to Mr. Byer-
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ley as he approached the crossing; that it was work-
ing, and that the bell in connection therewith was 
ringing loudly enough to be heard a distance of 293 
feet. In our opinion, if Mr. Byerley did no~t se~ tke 
signal, it was because he did not look, and it canno·t· 
be contended that he looked and did not see that 
which he must have seen had he looked. We are also 
sa.tisfied that had he listened, he must have heard 
the signal bell." (Italics ours.) 
There was some discussion in that case of what was 
termed a reasonable margin of safety rule. With respect 
to that, the Washington Supreme Court stated: 
"* * * We seriously doubt that the reason-
able margin of safety rule could or should be ap-
plied in favor of one approaching a railroad cross-
ing such as the one in question, hav.,ing a standard 
automatic signal device, which is clearly visible and 
operating at the time. We have never so held, nor 
have we been cited to any case so holding." 
In the case there was a discussion with respect to equal 
and reciprocal rights of travelers on a highway with rail-
road trains, and with respect to that the Washington 
Supreme Court stated: 
"* * * we cannot believe that the rights of 
such user of the highway and the train are equal~ 
when, as in this case, there was a warning signal 
in operation, complying with the state law, and 
again may we state we have been cited to no case 
which so holds. This signal is not a warning that 
one on the highway must just look and listen, after 
which he may, under certain circumstances, proceed, 
but the statute says he shall stop his vehicle and 
remain standing and not traverse any railroad grade 
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crossing when a huma~ flagman or mechanical or 
electrical· signal gives or continues. to give a signal 
of the approach or passage of any train. We cannot 
help but conclude that under the circumstances last 
above stated, and such as appeared at this. crossing 
at the time of the accident, the train had the abso-
lute right of way over highway traffic, from the time 
such signal began to operate until the train had 
passed over the crossing." 
A number of courts have held a person to be contri-
butorily negligent where in an ordinary passenger car he 
attempts to pass over a crossing in the face of a warning 
signal from a flagman or mechanical signal, and there are 
likewise cases involving vehicles engaged as public carriers 
of passengers, or inflammable liquid or dangerous explos-
ives, or vehicles of an excess size or weight, with respect to 
which similar holdings have been given by the various 
courts. 
In the ·case of Garbacz v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 
(Mich.) 34 N. W. 2d 531, a heavily ladened vehicle was 
involved. In that case the trial court directed a verdict for 
defendant, and the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the 
trial court. We quote from the opinion : 
"Plaintiff claims. that the blinker warning sig-
nals at the crossing were not working, that no bells 
or whistle were sounded, for if they had been, he 
would have heard them. He admitted, however, that 
he did not bring his tractor and trailers. to a stop, 
as required by law. He had been traveling at a rate 
of 35 miles per hour, but reduced his speed to 20 to 
25 miles. per hour as. he· neared the tracks. When 
about 25 feet from the tracks, he first saw the train 
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approaching about 50 feet to his. right. He tried to 
avoid the collision by attempting to stop and swerv-
ing to the left." 
The law applicable to the case provided that such a 
vehicle should not be driven across the railroad tracks at 
grade without first bringing the vehicle to a full stop with-
in 50 feet but not less than 10 feet from the tracks, and 
that the driver "shall not proceed until he shall have de-
termined that it is safe to cross." The Michigan Supreme 
Court held: "Violation of the law is negligence per se." The 
court also stated: 
"Plaintiff contends, however, that the·re· is no 
showing that the failure to stop before crossing the 
tracks contributed to the accident. 1 t is not neces-
sary to show ~vhat was so perfectly obvious. It w-ould 
follow from what the proofs disclosed, that at the rate 
the train was approaching, had plaintiff stopped,, he 
would have seen the train straight ahead of him or 
it would have crossed the road before he started 
again. Where the record is suck that men with rear 
sonable minds w-ould not differ, as here, there is' no 
question of faet for the jury. Swift v. Kenbeek, 289 
Mich. 391, 286 N. W. 658." (Italics ours.) 
In the case of Lang v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (Wis.) 
< 40 N. W. 2d 548, plaintiff sued for injuries to himself and 
'J 
. damages to his truck. In that case there was also a statute 
>which required a person driving a truck to stop not less 
·: than 20 or more than 40 feet from the track, and the evi-
;.:. dence showed that the plaintiff did not stop as required by 
~~.· law. The trial court submitted the matter to a jury, which 
~; returned a verdict for plaintiff. The Wisconsin Supreme 
~: 
~,. 
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Court held Lang to be guilty of negligence as, a matter of 
law and reversed the trial court's judgment. In that case 
it appeared that there were box cars on a side track near 
the street which obstructed the view of an approaching 
motorist, and the trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
"A railroad company which, by leaving cars 
near or upon a public crossing, has obstructed the 
view and created an extra danger to travelers, is 
bound to use extra precaution in the operation of 
its trains by approaching the crossing at a less 
amount of speed or by increased warnings, or other-
wise, and the fact that the crossing is within the 
yard of the railroad company makes no difference; 
and such railroad company is negligent if it leaves 
a car near or upon a public crossing and thereby 
obstructs the view and creates an extra danger to 
travelers without taking such extra precautions in 
the operation of its trains.'' 
With respect to this instruction the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin stated : 
"No authority is cited to support the instruc-
tion as applied to the facts in this case, and we find 
none. 
"It is considered that this is an incorrect state-
ment of the-law. In the first place it entirely ignores 
the effect of the statutory requirement that a per-
son driving a' truck across the main line tracks of · · · · · · 
a railway at a grade shall stop his truck at least 
20 and not more than 40 feet away. * * * 
''In placing the box car where they did, which 
was at a point, according to the testimony of the 
plaintiff, six to eight feet east of the east sidewalk 
on Pine street, defendant's employees had a right 
to assume that persons driving trucks across the 
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intersection would obey the statutory command and 
come to a full stop not less than 20 nor n1ore· than 
40 feet from the main line. * * * 
··It is appa·rent that if the plaintiff hcuJJ com-
plied ~vith the 'requiremen.ts of the statute no acci-
dent 'lvould have occurred." (Italics ours.) 
The Supreme Court stated further: 
"* * * The trainmen were not required to 
anticipa.te that a tnwk driver crossing the main line 
track wo1Jld violate the statutory· rule and not stop. 
"* * * To excuse the pla.intiff from per-
forming his statutory duty under the circumstances 
of th-is case would amount to noth~ng less than an 
amMtdment of the statute. The statute makes no· ex-
ceptions. A truck driver is required under the stat-
ute to come to a full stop, not to stop at his discre-
tion. * * *" (Italics ours.) 
In the case of New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. Powell, (Ind.) 
47 N. E. 2d 615, an Indiana statute provided that any driver 
of a motor vehicle transporting explosives or highly inflam-
mable materials should not drive upon tracks of a railroad 
company "unless such person shall first bring such vehicle 
to a full stop, and, shall ascertain definitely that no train, 
car or engine is approaching such crossing and is in such 
close proximity thereto as to create a hazard or danger of 
a collision." Powell was driving a gasoline truck which 
came into collision with one of defendant's trains. There 
was a wigwag and bell at the crossing, and there was a 
provision of the statute above referred to that the act should 
not apply to railroad crossings equipped with mechanical 
crossing signals. The Supreme Court of Indiana concluded 
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that: "It must have been the legislative conclusion that, 
of course, all travelers would take notice of the warning 
afforded by mechanical signals," and in spite of the ex-
ception in the statute, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court's verdict and judgment for plaintiff and 
held the deceased to have been guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law for failing to observe and heed the mechan-
ical signal, and for failing to stop in response to its warning. 
The jury found that the locomotive whistle and bell were 
properly sounded and that the automatic crossing bell was 
ringing, but that the decedent heard none of these signals. 
As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court stated that there 
was no dispute concerning the fact that the crossing signal 
was in actual operation. With respect thereto the Indiana 
Supreme Court stated: 
"* * * There is no allegation or proof of 
any abnormal situation that would have prevented 
the decedent from hearing the signal. It was heard 
by many persons farther away from the crossing 
than the decedent. It must be concluded that he 
could have heard it if he had listened, and that he 
either heard the signal and proceeded upon the· track 
notwithstanding, or that he failed to give his atten-
tion and to listen for the signal. In either event he 
was negligent, and the negligence was a definite con-
tributing cause of the collision.'' 
Because of conflict in the evidence with respect to 
signals from the train, the Supreme Court said that al-
though the preponderance of the evidence indicated that 
these signals were given, still because of some conflicting 
testimony, it would have to be assumed on the appeal that 
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the railroad was negligent with respect to signals from the 
train. In spite of this fact and in spite of the fact that 
the court said such negligence should be considered as a con-
tributing cause, the Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the 
trial court on the basis that the negligence of Powell also 
contributed to the accident. It appeared in evidence that 
there was some obstruction to vision, and with respect to 
this the jury found that the deceased could see down the 
main track only to the extent of 150 feet when his motor 
vehicle was at a point 14 feet south of the south end of the 
ties on the main track of the crossing, and for a distance 
of 400 feet when his vehicle was 6 feet 2 inches south of the 
' 
south end of the ties; that the obstructed vision prevented 
him from seeing the train, and because of such obstructed 
vision he slowed his speed. There was no evidence, how-
ever, as to whether he stopped his truck. The jury based 
its verdict entirely upon the fact of the obstructed vision, 
plus the speed at which the train was operating. In re-
versing the trial court the Indiana Supreme Court stated 
that there was no evidence of unusual noises calculated to 
interfere with the hearing of usual signals and warnings. 
With respect to interference with the vision and signals 
the Supreme Court stated: 
"The .appellee says that there was fog and. rain 
which interfered with vision and with hearing sig-
nals, but, if so, the fact must have been apparent. 
It did not affect the signals; it merely affected the 
ability of the traveler to see and hear. The law re-
quires that he use care in looking· and listening, ant!J 
this ca.re must be commensurate with the conditions 
which confront him. There is no allegation in the 
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complaint that the signals were inadequate because 
of weather conditions, nor do we· find any evidence 
of fog. There was some evidence that it was· rain-
ing. But the decedent was acquainted with the cross-
ing and with the automatic signal upon which he re-
lied. If rain interfered with the normal opportunity 
to observe these signals of danger, it was his duty 
to take cognizance of the fact and to use his senses 
in a 1'Ytanner reasonably calculated to~ inform him 
of approaching dang·er. He was not free to drive 
blindly into a place of known danger. * * *" 
(Italics ours.) 
As a conclusion from the findings of the Jury, the 
Supreme Court stated with respect to deceased: 
"* * * that he either heard the bell and 
went upon the crossing notwithstanding, or that he 
failed to give his attention to and listen for the auto-
matic signal. In either event he was guilty of con-
tributory negligence." 
The court disposed of the case by saying: 
"It was error to deny the appellant's motion for 
judgment on the answers to the interrogatories not-
withstanding the general verdict. 
"Judgment reversed, with instructions to enter 
judgment for the defendant on the answers to the 
interrogatories." 
In the case of Scott v. Kurn et al., (Mo.) 126 S. W. 2d 
I 
185, the plaintiff drove a truck distributing gasoline in the 
Town of Cuba, Missouri. Under the Missouri law such 
operators of gasoline trucks were required to exercise the 
highest degree of care in crQssing railway crossings. A 
collision occurred when he drove his truck in front of one 
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of the defendant's passenger trains. There was a sharp 
I 
dispute upon the question as to whether or not the defend-
ant railroad company was negligent. As plaintiff approach-
ed the track with his truck, there was an oil tank car upon a 
switch track about 75 feet west of the highway over which 
he was traveling. Plaintiff testified· that he slackened the 
speed of his truck and was listening and looking for trains 
but admitted that he did not stop his truck before he at-
tempted to drive over the crossing. Because of the rule re-
quiring him to exercise the highest degree of care, the 
Missouri Supreme Court held that he should have looked 
after he got past the obstruction of the tank car, even 
though the distance within which he would have such view 
was rather small, and although in the trial court the ver-
dict of the jury was for the defendant, the Missouri Supreme 
Court in affirming the judgment for defendant held that 
plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. The 
track was straight for more than 800 feet from the crossing 
in the direction from which the train came. There was a -
distance of 9 feet between the nearest rails of the ·switch 
track and the main line track, and the distance from 
the bumper of the truck to where plaintiff was seated in 
his truck was 7 feet 10 inches. The Supreme Court stated: 
"* * * We are of the opinion that these phy-
sical facts and the evidence of plaintiff convict him 
of negligence as a matter of law. It was plaintiff's 
duty to exercise the highest degree of care. Ordi-
nary care would have required him to look to the 
west for an approaching train. Plaintiff could have 
at a glance seen the train in full view, before the 
front wheels of his truck reached the south rail of 
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the main line track. Note again that there was a 
space of nine feet between the rails ; that plaintiff 
was sitting in a seat the back of which was less 
than eight feet from the bumper of the truck; that 
the tank car was more than seventy-five feet to the 
west of him. * * *" 
In the case at bar the deceased, John T. Toomer, if he 
elected to proceed in the face of a warning signal would 
be chargeable at least with exercising the highest degree of 
care in doing so and not just ordinary care. He had as 
much if not more opportunity for view as either of the truck 
drivers in the two cases last mentioned and his duty to 
exercise extreme care would be as great. He could not pro-
, 
ceed blindly past the freight train standing on the passing 
track, nor could he proceed qver the crossing without 
slackening his speed so that he would have some view after 
he had passed the standing freight. Measurements on Ex-
hibit 1, which is drawn to scale, even assuming that the 
front of the engine was at a point where the witness Har-
mon, son-in-law of deceased, measured, namely 32 feet south 
of the end of the planking, will show that had Toomer been 
paying any attention at all and had he attempted to look to 
the south at all as he passed in front of the freight train, 
he would have been able to see past the front of the freight 
train and down the main line track for a distance of approxi-
mately 200 feet before he had crossed over the passing 
track on which the freight train was located and when he 
would still have been 15 feet from the main line track. Had 
he paid any attention to the. signal and decided nevertheless 
to cross in spite of the warning signal, it would have at 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
least been his duty to proceed slowly and to keep a vigilant 
lookout to the south and have his truck under such control 
that he could bring it to a stop in the event a train was a p-
.. 
proaching on the main line track. There is no escape from 
the conclusion, under the facts shown by the record in this 
case, that in the face of such warning signal Toomer should 
be held to have proceeded at his peril. 
The rule as stated in Corpus Juris was quoted· in the 
case of Scott v. /(urn, supra, as follows: 
"The presence of standing cars at a crossing 
is a notice of danger, calling on the traveler to exer-
cise the greater care which ordinary caution re-
quires ; and where the view of one about to enter 
upon a railroad crossing is obstructed by standing 
cars, if he attempts to cross without exercising 
proper care to look and listen for the purpose of dis-
covering an approaching train as soon as it can be 
seen, as immediately after reaching the end of, or 
passing, the standing cars which obstruct his view, 
and if, where necessary to do so, he fails to stop 
to look and listen for the purpose, he is chargeable 
with contributory negligence precluding recovery, 
notwithstanding negligence on the part of the rail-
road company in failing to sound the proper warn-
ing signals." 
If this be true as a general rule, then where there is a 
warning signal bei.ng given as was true in the case at bar, 
a traveler should be held to proceed at his peril. It must be 
remembered that the statute not only requires the driver 
to stop but states that he must not proceed "until he can do 
so safely." The burden is thus on him not to determine 
whether he may have a margin of safety, and not to guess 
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or speculate as to whether he might make it across, but that 
he "shall not proceed until he can do so safely." 
In the case of Shelby v. Southern Pac. Co. et al., (Cal.) 
157 P. 2d 442, the California law provided that any vehicle 
carrying inflammable liquids should stop not less than 10 
nor more than 50 feet from the track, and while so stopped 
' listen and look in both directions. Failure to stop constituted 
a misdemeanor. Shelby attempted to drive a truck loaded 
with kerosene across the tracks at about 3:30 a.m. and col-
lided with the tender of an engine which was backing over 
a spur track across the intersection. Shelby did not bring 
his vehicle to a stop as required by the statute. The trial 
court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the 
appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, saying: 
"The statutory inhibition of an act by the t1n.-
position of a penalty for its violation creates an 
absolute standard of behavior. In forbidding a ker-
osene-laden motor truck to cross a railroad track 
without first stopping, section 5·76 establishes a rule 
of the road which is not debatable. * * * That 
such a stricture upon the transportation of specified 
commercial cargoes imposes hardships upon drivers 
of such motor trucks in traversing a boulevard which 
is crossed at frequent intervals by spurs off a main 
line railway is no excuse for violating the statute·. 
The driver of such a truck is not excusable because 
he does not see the track." 
The appellate court also stated: 
"* * * That the failure of S·helby to· stop 
before crossing the track ca.used or con.tributed to 
cause the accident is not open to argument. , There 
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would have been no collision if the truck had stopped 
ten feet south of the point of its attempted cro·ssing." 
(Italics ours.) 
The last statement is very much in point in the case at 
bar. The testimony shows that the contact points. which 
would start the wigwag signal to working were 1,650 feet 
from the crossing (R. 338). Thus should we assume the 
train to have been going at the fastest rate of speed stated 
by plaintiff or any of his witnesses-/ 60 miles an hour-· it 
would have taken slightly in excess of 18 seconds for the 
train to reach the crossing after the signals started to op-
erate. If the train had been going no faster than the 30 
miles an hour which the city ordinance provided, it would 
have taken the train only 37 seconds to reach the crossing. 
Thus any inconvenience that Toomer may have sqffered 
i 
in stopping for the signal would have continued for only 
slightly more than a half minute, whereas plaintiff's wit-
ness Cozzins stated that he stopped, .. and waited for two o;r 
three minutes before proceeding, not because of any warn-
ing from the wigwag signal because he did not observe 
such, but he stopped because of the freight train. 
Regardless of the speed at which the train may have 
been traveling, if it had been going 60 miles an hour it 
would have taken only 18 seconds to reach the crossing; 
if it had been going 30 miles an hour it would have taken 
37 seconds ; and if it had been going 50 miles an hour it · 
would have taken 22· seconds to reach the crossing. Thus 
by paraphrasing the last statement given from the Shelby 
case, we must conclude: "that the failure of Toomer to 
stop before crossing the track caused or contributed to 
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cause the accident is not open to argument. There would 
have been no collision if he had stopped his truck 10 feet 
west of the· point of its attempted crossing." 
In Lake Mo-tor Freig·ht Line v. New York Cent. R. Co~., 
(Ind.) 90 N. E. 2d 512, a similar statute was involved, re-
quiring a driver to stop and not to p-roceed until it was 
safe to do so. Plaintiff's truck driver was killed in a col-
lision at the crossing. It was contended that the passenger 
train involved in the collision was tra~eling in excess of the 
25 miles per hour speed limit set by the city ordinance; that 
the defendant obstructed the view of the approaching pas-
senger train by having a long freight train on a side track; 
that the freight train caused the crossing signal to operate 
for some time prior to the collision, causing a. situation 
which was misleading and confusing; and also. that the 
railroad company violated its own safety rules concerning 
protection of the crossing. 
The question of whether or not the automatic signal 
at the ·crossing was in operation and whether or not the 
deceased stopped, and the speed of and whether or not 
signals from the train were given, were all in dispute, and 
the evidence with respect thereto was conflicting. The 
matter was submitted to a. jury on a charge including spe-
cial interrogatories. 'The jury gave a verdict for the· de-
fendant, and the Indiana Appellate Court in affirming the 
trial court's judgment thereon said that the essential facts 
to sustain the jury were found in the answers· to special 
interrogatories. wherein the jury found that (1) the cross-
ing signal was in operation and ('2') flashing continuously 
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until the time of the collision ; ( 3) the crossing bell or gong 
was ringing;. (4) the deceased did not stop his truck before 
attempting to cross the tracks; ( 5) the freight train was 
moving towards the crossing about 150 feet away; and (6) 
the whistle on the passenger train was sounded. These facts 
having been found by the jury were considered by the ap-
pellate court sufficient to sustain the judgment. 
In the case at bar (1) there is no dispute that the wig-
wag was in operation; (2) the red light in the center of 
the wigwag was on and S!Vinging back-and-forth; (3) the 
crossing bell was ringing; ( 4) the deceased, Toomer, did 
not slow down or stop prior to attempting to cross, nor did 
he slow down in traveling to the point of collision; ( 5) 
there was a dispute as to the location of the freight, but 
there is no dispute over the fact that it had not caused the 
operation of the wigwag-it could not have done so-and 
therefore there was no question in the case at bar of con-
tinuous operation of the wigwag that would require a trav-
eler to wait any excess time ; and finally ( 6) the whistle 
and bell on the Streamliner were being sounded continuously, 
and the whistle at least was- heard by, nearly everyone else 
in the vicinity; and this plus the fact that the freight train 
gave a warning to travelers by one or more toots of its 
whistle. 
In the case of Miller et al. v. Chicago, R·. I. & P. Ry. 
Co., (S. D.)_ 40 N. W. 2d 324, the plaintiff was driving a 
gasoline transport in a southerly direction and was struck 
by defendant's engine going east. South Dakota law pro-
vided that before crossing the railroad tracks he should 
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stop and not proceed until he should ascertain he could do 
so safely. There were obstructions to view as he approached 
the crossing. There was no wigwag or mechanical signal at 
the crossing. When plaintiff arrived at a point 50 to 75 
feet north of the crossing, he saw defendant's engine 35 to 
45 feet west of the crossing and he thought it was stand-
ing stationary. H'e heard no whistle or bell or other warn-
ing from the train so proceeded without stopping. As the 
front wheels of his. tractor-trailer came upon the rails, he 
saw the engine moving down upon him. He had stopped 
half a block away where there were industry tracks but 
did not stop again for the main line track. He sought to 
excuse himself because of traffic following him, ·which by 
his stopping might be stopped on the industry tracks, and 
also because no signal was given. The trial court submitted 
the case to a jury which returned a verdict for plaintiff. 
The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court 
on the basis that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of 
law. We quote from the opinion: 
"* * * The duties imposed upon him were 
two : first, to stop; second, 'to ascertain when such 
crossing can be made in safety.' * * * It must 
be conceded that had Miller conformed to the re-
quired standard plaintiffs' gasoline transport, loaded 
with -inflammable liquid, would have escaped ~he 
damaging impact with defendant's engine. 
* * * * * 
"The effect of the statute is to require of the 
drivers of loaded gasoline transports the utmost 
care on their part in avoiding collisions with rail-
road engines, trains, etc. The law was intended to 
eliminate the consequences of disasters involving or 
likely to involve the public. To accomplish this aim 
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the clear command to the driver of a loaded gasoline 
transport is that he first stop and then find out 
that he will encounter no danger if he crosses the 
tracks. Should we interpret the applicable code pro-
visions as contended by plaintiffs' counsel the re-
sult would be a substitute for that which is plainly 
written into law and a lower standard of conduct 
for drivers of the special class now charged with 
the duty to avoid the common danger at railroad 
crossings. But a little tinkering with the clause of 
the statute. I. E., 'to ascertain when such crossing 
can be made in safety,' would reduce the legislative 
m,andate to the general rule gov·erning the conduct 
of drivers of ordinary mo·tor vehicles." (Italics ours.) 
It may be argued that such a case is not applicable 
here because there is more danger to· the general public with 
a loaded gasoline transport. There is the same danger of 
disaster to any individual who attempts to proceed over 
a crossing in the face of a mechanical signal, and our law 
gives the definite command that he must stop and not 
proceed until he can do so safely. It does not say he must 
stop and then proceed with due care, or that he can then 
proceed even if using the utmost or highest degree of care, 
but the law says he must STOP AND NOT PROCEED 
UNTIL HE CAN DO SO SA·FE·LY. Clearly, one who neither 
stops nor proceeds with caution cannot be excused, and 
where Toomer neither slowed nor stopped, but proceeded 
over the crossing at 25 or 30 miles an hour, reasonable 
minds could not differ but would be compelled to hold him 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. 
The Miller case goes on to state: 
"* * * 'The command is that the driver shall 
not proceed until he knows that to proceed is safe. 
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* * * He had no right to assume what he could 
not know.' * * * 
"Miller took a chance on a guess and he now 
argues that the wrong guess was justifiable. It was 
either safe or dangerous for him to go forward. The 
law says he was bound to kno-w that it was safe and 
that he mus·t stop in order to acquire the krwwledge 
of safety. He did not stop and it is obvious that he 
entered a path of danger assuming instead of know-
ing that harm w'ould not result from his traversilng 
that path with his extended and heavily laden trans~ 
port. A brief pause would have enabled him to know 
of the danger he assumed no·t to be impending. His 
failure to stop and to ascertain that· it was then 
soafe for him to cro·ss the tracks fell far short of 
the duty the law expressly imposed upon him and 
constituted negligence contributing, to the harm 
which thereupon and therefrom ensued. (Italics 
ours.) 
"The judgment appealed from is reversed and 
the case remanded with directions to dismiss plain-
tiffs' complaint." 
With respect to Mr. Toomer in the case at bar "the 
law says he was bound to know that it was safe and that 
he must stop in order to acquire the knowledge of safety. 
He did not stop and it is obvious that he entered a path of 
danger assuming instead of knowing that harm would not 
result." We do not know what Toomer assumed, if anything. 
There is no evidence that he assumed that the freight was 
activating the signal and he would not have been justified 
in so assuming and proceeding blindly without slackening 
his speed. uA brief paus·e would have enabled him to know 
of the danger he assum.ed not to- be impending. His failure 
to- stop and to ascertain that it was then safe for kim to 
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cross the t1·acks fell far short of the duty the law· expressly 
imposed upml. him and constituted negligence contributing 
to the harm lchich thereupon. and therefrom ensued." 
Quite a number of courts have held it to be contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law where a driver proceeds 
over a crossing in the face of an ope·rating mechanical 
signal, without reference to the question of whether or 
not there is a statute requiring the driver to stop or setting 
any criminal penalty for a violation of any law requiring 
a stop. 
In the case of Larsen v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co., 
(Mich.) 227 N. W. 665, the court stated: 
"Plaintiff, on his way to work, just before· day-
light, driving his automobile on a street in Flint, 
came to a railroad crossing of defendant. The cross-
ing was protected by a lighted wigwag and a bell. 
\ The positive testimony, against which the negative 
testimony made no issue, is that as plaintiff ap-
proached the crossing the bell was ringing and the 
wigwag was operating, showing a red light~ The 
crossing was near a large automobile plant. The 
night shift was leaving, and the day shift entering. 
Many automobiles were in the street, to which plain-
tiff, in driving, gave his attention. A sudden move-
ment of an automobile ahead caused plaintiff to 
stop, and in doing so he stalled his motor. He stopped 
on the crossing. The train was approaching on a 
curve. There were cars on a side track. At what 
distance from the crossing the enginemen might 
have observed plaintiff's peril the record is not 
clear. Probably it was nearly 400 feet. Perhaps, on 
plaintiff's own testimony, it was much less. At the 
conclusion of plaintiff's case a verdict was directed 
for defendant. Plaintiff brings error." 
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It was argued. that the railroad company should have 
been liable under the last clear chance theory, but the Su .. 
preme c·ourt of Michigan stated: ''The record is barren 
of evidence to sustain this theory." On the question of 
negligence and contributory negligence, disregarding the 
last clear chance, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded: 
"* * * If defendant's negligence be assumed, 
plaintiff's contributory negligence precludes recovery. 
The record shows an almost total failure of plaintiff 
to take precaution for his own safety, and a lack of 
proper attention to the crossing and its warnings. 
"We find no error. 
"Judgment affirmed." 
In Nice v. Illinois Cent. R. Co·., (Ill.) 25 N. E. 2d 104, 
plaintiff's deceased, a trucker, was killed when his truck 
collided with defendant's fast passenger train in the Town 
of ;Chestnut, Illinois, just before noon of a F'ebruary day. 
There was a mechanical wigwag signal with a bell at the 
crossing,· and all witnesses except a daughter of the· de-
ceased testified that it was in operation at the time of 
the accident. There were buildings which obstructed the 
view of the track as one approached, then a space of about 
2,0 fe,et where one could see. Thereafter there were more 
obstructions, including a depot building belonging to the 
defendant company which obstructed the view until one 
was about 15 feet from the main line. The passenger train 
involved did not stop in the T'own of Chestnut and was 
traveling at the rate of 90 miles. per hour. The grounds of 
negligence charged were excess speed of the train, failure 
to have a flagman, and also that the wigwag was not prop-
erly located for a traveler to see. 
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It was contended that the ·Chestnut s·tation agent us-
ually acted as a. flagman at the crossing when fast trains 
were due. The Illinois Appellate Court dismissed this. con-
tention briefly by saying: 
"The record is bare of any evidence tending to 
sho\Y that appellee's intestate had any knowledge of 
such custom or relied upon the same. * * *" 
In the case at bar there was no evidence that the wig-
wag either at the time of the accident or at any other tim.e 
had operated excessively or that it had operated when a 
train was on the passing track, and there was no basis for 
contending that Toomer assumed or had any right to as-
sume that the standing freight was operating the wigwag. 
All of the evidence is to the contrary, and from the facts 
it is conclusive that if Toomer had stopped at all In re-
sponse to the wigwag-even for five seconds-he would 
have saved himself. 
In the Nice case, the trial court submitted the matter 
to a jury which returned a verdict for plaintiff, but the 
Illinois Appellate c·ourt held the deceased to have been 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of, law and 
reversed the trial court. The Appellate Court stated: 
"* * * in this case we have the picture of 
a man driving onto a railroad track in the face of 
many warning signals. The wigwag was in opera-
tion, the automatic crossing bell was ringing, a 'stop' 
sign and a standard railroad sign with crossarms was 
placed at the crossing within easy view of the driver, 
* * * as well as the horn or whistle and the 
automatic bell on the engine sounding continuously. 
Most of these warnings were seen and heard by 
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many people for a distance of 100 feet and over. To 
utterly disregard all of these signals and warnings 
seems to us to indicate an entire absence of due 
care. * * * 
"The fact that from a certain point in the high-
way ·the view of the· wigwag was obscured to the 
driver of an automobile did not in any manner re-
lieve him of the duty to use due care commensurate 
with the circumstances. Sunnes v. Illinois Cent. R. 
Co., 201 Ill. App. 378. 
"* * * The question of due care on the part 
of a plaintiff is a question for the jury when there 
is any evidence given on the trial which, with any 
legitimate inference that may be legally and justi-
fiably drawn therefrom, tends tQ show the use of 
due care; but where the evidence, with all legitimate 
inferences that may be legally and justifiably drawn 
therefrom, does not tend to show due care on the 
part of plaintiff, the trial court is justified in in-
structing the jury to return a verdict for defendant." 
In the case at bar there were num-erous warnings which 
Toomer could have heeded in addition to the wigwag. The 
freight train whistled one or more times, (R. 115, 2·20, 249) 
and the Streamliner whistle was sounding continuously and 
was heard by all of the men in the cab of the freight engine 
as -well as others driving motor vehicles jn the area, some 
S·everal blocks to the east of the crossing. Mrs. Sparks 
crossed over the main line and then turned around, look-
. -
ing to the· south toward the approaching Streamliner. The 
testimony is that she turned and faced the west, but she 
said she was watching the approaching Streamliner and 
did not even see Toomer until the actual moment of the 
collis.ion. Her turning and looking in the direction of the 
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approaching train should in itself have given some addi-
tional indication to Toomer. There was no claim here that 
the wigwag was not properly located, nor any reason given 
why Toomer should not have seen or observed it and obeyed 
its warning. As was said in the Nice case: "Most of these 
warni11oas were seen and heard by many people for a dis-
tance of 100 feet and over. To utterly disregard all of 
these signals and warnings seems to us to indicate an 
entire absence of due care." 
In the case of Rothstein v. Boston & Maine R. R., 
(Mass.) 2 N. E. 2d 205, Rothstein was killed in a grade cross-
ing collision with defendant's passenger train on a Septem-
ber night at the "State Street Crossing" in the Town of New-
bury, Massachusetts. Three sets of railroad tracks ran 
north and south, and the highway crossed from northeast 
to southwest. The truck was traveling in a southwesterly 
direction and the train was going north. It was admitted 
in the case by plaintiff's counsel in his opening statement 
to the jury that automatic red flasher lights at the cross-
ing were in operation and flashing their signals as deceased 
approached. However, there was testimony to the effect 
that trains were shifting back and forth north of the cross-
ing on the side from which the deceased approached. The 
engineer and ·fireman testified that the whistle was. blown 
and the bell ringing on the passenger engine, but other 
witnesses in the vicinity testified that they heard no bell 
or whistle, this latter testimony being purely of a negative 
characte·r. There was also some testimony that there was 
a flagman at the crossing. Some of the witnesses saw him 
there after the accident, and some said he had a white 
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light and was swinging it in such a way as to invite one 
to proceed over the crossing. The trial court denied a mo-
tion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to a jury, 
which returned a verdict for plaintiff. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial court and stated: 
"A finding of negligence on the part of the 
defendant was not warranted. The evidence in its 
aspect most favorable to the plaintiff shows that 
his intestate was guilty of contributory negligence 
as matter of law. (Cases cited.) The exceptions to 
the refusal of the trial judge to grant the defen-
dant's motion for a directed verdict on the second 
count of the amended declaration must be sustained. 
In view of the conclusion reached, the other excep-
tions of the defendant need not be considered. Judg-
ment is to be entered for the defendant." 
In the case of Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. D'ay,, (Tex.) 
193 S. W. 2d 722, the railroad tracks ran east and west and 
the street north and south. There were three tracks from 
south to north as follows: a team track, then a passing 
track, and then the main line. There was a space of about 
10 feet between the passing track and the main line. The 
crossing was protected by automatic flashing lights which 
would be activated by main line trains within half a mile 
of the crossing. The lights, however, would also be acti-
vated by cars or trains on the side tracks within 30 feet 
of the crossing. Plaintiff approached the crossing from 
the south and a train was proceeding east on the passing 
track. Plaintiff stopped to wait for the passing train and 
as it cleared the crossing by 50 or 60 yards, he said he 
looked, saw nothing, and started to cross. The Appellate 
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Court said that there was no question but what the flasher 
lights \Yere working at the time because the lights were 
activated by switching trains and cars on other tracks, and 
there was testimony that the lights were flashing nearly 
all of the time and that no one paid any attention to them 
at all. The trial court submitted the case to a jury, which 
returned a verdict for plaintiff. The District Court of 
Appeals held the plaintiff to be guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law and reversed the trial court. We quote from 
the opinion : 
''A careful consideration of the testimony as a 
whole and the testimony of plaintiff himself com-
pels the conclusion that he either failed to look for 
the warning signals or saw and ignored them. 
"Crossing signals that fail to function as de-
signed are a source of danger rather than safety. 
On the other hand, a disregard for properly func-
tioning signals is a. source of great danger. The 
trains are operated in reliance on the motorist heed-
ing such signals and gov·erning· his c·onduct thereby. 
(Italics ours.) 
"In essence there can be but little difference 
between a motorist disregarding the signal of a 
flagman not to cross and disregarding an automatic 
signal so warning him. No doubt on occasions one 
may cross an intersecting railroad track in face of 
a flagman's signal not to do so. These signals, 
whether given by flagmen or by automatic devices, 
should and no doubt do allow a :margin of safety. 
In the case of St. Louis B. & M. R. Co., et al. v. 
P·aine, Tex. Civ. App., 188 S. W. 1033, this court in 
somewhat analogous situation held as a matter of 
law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence." 
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It is interesting to note that in this case the Texas 
court said. there was no general law in Texas making it a 
penal offense to cross in the face of a warning light. The 
court nevertheless held the plaintiff guilty of negligence as 
a matter of law. By the very statement as quoted above 
and just referred to, the inference is given, which is in 
accord with the general rule, that if there is a penal of-
fense provided by statutory or other law, then violation of 
such law is negligence per se. 
The law applicable to the case at bar does provide a 
penal offense. Se·ction 57-7-2.24 provides that any violation 
of the. act is a misdemeanor. Therefore, it was negligence 
per se for Toomer to attempt to drive over the crossing in 
question in face of the w~gwag light and bell without stop-
ping and without waiting until he could and did determine 
that it was safe for him to do so. 
We quote further from the opinion of the n·ay case: 
"It is true that on either the team or passing 
track a standing car or train within thirty feet of 
either side of the crossing would activate the lights; 
that a train on the main track in approximately 
half a mile of either side of the crossing standing 
still would activate the lights. However, those lights 
were intended to warn of the approach of a_ train in 
dangerous proximity to the crossing. This the plain-
tiff understood. There is, as we have stated, no sub-
stantial evidence that the defendants kept these 
lights flashing at all times. or any considerable por-
tion of the time; no evidence that they flashed save 
when it was necessary to warn the public that the 
crossing was dangerous. That other persons. on 
other occasions had passed over this crossing in 
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disregard of the light, in our opinion has no bearing 
on the issue. These grade crossings are common 
throughout the entire country. In many cases, no 
doubt, they are what might be termed a necessary 
evil. The jury found here that this was an extra 
hazardous crossing. If there be evidence to sustain 
this finding (and same is not attacked) , then this 
we think would not excuse the plaintiff from the 
exercise of all care. Had he heeded these warning 
lights he would not have received the severe injuries 
·he did suffer. Even after he had crossed the team 
track and the passing track there was time for him 
to have still saved himself had he heeded the signal. 
It is fair to assume, we think, that as he crossed over 
the team track he could see there was no train ap-
proaching within dangerous distance on that track; 
the same when he crossed the passing track, and 
then the only danger indicated was from the main 
track, and he deliberately drove on to same in front 
of a passing train in the face of a warning that it 
was near. In attempting to make this crossing, 
under the circumstances, plaintiff recklessly and 
carelessly speculated with his own safety. The cases 
cited below are deemed to support our finding that 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as 
a matter of law, and can not recover. (Cases cited.) 
The long and short of the matter is that in absolute-
disregard of signals to refrain from going upon the 
track on account of the imminent approach of a train 
plaintiff drove thereon and suffered the serious in-
juries complained of. His action amounted to con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law." 
See also Poague v. Kurn, (Mo.) 140 'S. W. 2d 13, where 
without reference to any statute the court held the plaintiff 
to have been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter 
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of law where he attempted to drive over a crossing in the 
face of an operating wigwag signal. 
It will be contended by plaintiff that the fact that 
there was a stormy condition present would make some 
difference. There is s~me dispute with respect to the con-
dition of the storm but the most that can be said with re-
spect to the testimony of any of plaintiff's witnesses is 
that one or two of them gave a general conclusion that 
"visibility was poor." The other testimony, however, shows 
that the storm was not very effective as far as obstructing 
any view of travelers approaching the track. Plaintiff's 
witness ·Cozzins had no difficulty in seeing the train between 
the depot and the water tank. Harmon testified that one 
could see at least up to 200 yards (R. 188). The witness 
Curtis had no difficulty seeing the train as he was. ap-
proaching the crossing, .and he was 5 or 6 blocks away com-
ing from the east part of town in his automobile. He even 
saw the train as well as heard its.· whistle when it was a 
mile away at the Olsen crossing (R. 146). Regardless of 
the condition of the weather, however, rain, fog, snow or 
other storm does not excuse one approaching a railroad 
crossing from the exercise of due care but instead imposes 
upon such traveler the duty of exercising greater care. 
In the case of Shaw v. C1hicago & E. I. R. Co·., (Ill.) 
7S N. E. 2d 51, the court said: 
"* * * It is true that the mist and fog and 
rain may have to some extent interfered with her 
vision, but if so, this required a greater degree· of 
care on her part.'' 
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That was a case where the trial court had granted judg-
ment for the plaintiff. The Illinois Appellate Court re-
versed the trial court and directed judgment for the defen-
dant. 
In the case of Papageorge v. Boston & M. R. R., (Mass.) 
57 N. E. 57 6, the court said : 
"There was no traffic moving in the vicinity of 
the crossing just before the accident except the train 
and the truck. There is nothing in the record to 
suggest that the crossing was a noisy place. The 
plaintiff, according to his own testimony, kne·w that 
a train was due, and there was nothing to distract 
his attention or to prevent him from exercising an 
appropriate degree of watchfulness as he approached 
the crossing. If his range of vision of the approach-
ing train was restricted by the storm, then he should 
have adopted such other reasonable measures as 
common prudence dictated in order to ascertain if 
it were safe to cross. (Cases cited.) " 
See also Negretti v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (Md.) 16 
A. 2d 902. 
Regardless of the fact that there was a spring storm 
in progress, such storm was. not sufficient to obscure a 
:~; 
view of the wigwag, and it would not in any manner affect 
the hearing of one situated as T'oomer was had he but 
- stopped to listen. The witness Harmon, Toomer's son-in-
law, testified that the visibility was not limited short of 
200 yards (R. 188). That would have been sufficient to 
enable Toomer to see an approaching train in spite of the 
storm had he proceeded slowly over the crossing. He would, 
in all events, have been able to see the wigwag, swinging 
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disk and light, and to hear its bell, and if he had stopped 
in response thereto, there is no question but what he would 
have heard the Streamliner whistle. 
-
The trial court should have directed a verdict in favor 
of the defendant and against plaintiff and should have 
given to the jury defendant's Instruction No.1 as requested. 
The court committed reversible error by refusing to do so. 
POINT II 
THE T·RIAL COURT ERRE·D IN INSTRUCT-
ING AN·D ALLOWING THE JURY T:o FIND 
THE DE'FENDANT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE 
EVEN THOUGH THE JURY SHOULD . FIND 
TH'AT THE TRAIN ENTERED THE 'CROSS-
ING AT' A SPEED OF 30 MILES AN H·OUR. 
(Statement of Errors No. 3 and No. 5.) 
There was testimony from defendant's witnesses. in 
the. case at bar from which the jury could have· concluded 
tha.t the Streamliner train was not exceeding the speed 
limit of 30 miles per hour at the· time· it entered the crossing 
(R. 290, 291). Nevertheless, by Instructions No. 10 and 
No. 23, and particularly by subparagraph (b) of each of 
said instructions, the court authorized the jury to find the 
defendant guilty of negligence on the basis of speed alone 
even though the train came onto the crossing at 30 miles 
an hour, which admittedly was within the speed limit, the 
court stating that the jury could so find "in view of all 
of the conditions then existing." 
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In Instruction No. 13, subparagraph (i), the court 
instructed the jury that darkness or stormy weather alone 
in the vicinity of the crossing when the wigwag signal was 
in operation was not a condition that should be considered 
as unusual, and we submit in that particular portion of the 
instruction the court was correct. However, such instruc-
tion when read with Instructions No. 10, No. 23, and other 
portions of Instruction No. 13 is very conflicting. 
Let us find out just what were the conditions at the 
crossing that could have been referred to by the court in 
Instruction No. 10. There was no excess amount of travel 
either on the highway or over the rails shown in the evi-
dence, and there was no noise at the crossing either from 
industries located in the area-of which there were none--
or from other traffic. There were no traffic noises. The 
only noise there was, if any, in the vicinity of the crossing 
was the noise from the wigwag and ringing bell at the 
crossing and such noise as would have been made by the 
whistle of the approaching Streamliner or the Streamliner's 
bell. There was not even any testimony that the freight 
train standing at the crossing made any noise, and all 
.. .. three of the occupants in the cab of the freight engine 
who would be affected more by the noise, if any, that might 
be made by the engine, all heard the signal at the crossing 
and the sign·als from the approaching Streamliner. 
A speed of 30 miles an hour would not have been in 
violation of any city ordinance or any law referred to in 
the case at all. It is uniformly held by the courts in these 
modern days that speed of a train in and of itself is not 
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negligence, and unless there is a failure to sound signals 
on an approaching train or unless there is noise at a cr<>ss-
ing or something at the crossing which would render or-
dinary signals indistinct s_o that they would not be heard, 
or unless the crossing is shown to be unusually hazardous 
by reason of excess traffic thereon, it is not negligence to 
run such train at any speed the railroad company may 
choose. 
In the case of New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. Powell, (Ind.) 
4 7 N. E. 2d 615, the accident in question occurred at a 
crossing in a residential portion of a town of 600 popula-
tion. The court held : 
"Speed of itself never constitutes negligence· in 
the absence of a limiting statute or ordinance. We 
must reach the same conclusion as the court did in 
Union Traction ·Co. v. Howard, Adm'·r, 1910, 173 
Ind. 335, 340, 90 N. E. 764, 765, in which it is said: 
'We think there is but one act of negligence alleged; 
that it requires the concurrence of a high and dan-
gerous rate of speed, coupled or concurring with a 
failure to give warning, to constitute the negligence 
charged.' * * *" 
In State v. Poe et al., (Md.) 190 A .. 231, Poe was driver 
of a bus transporting a group of school children returning 
at about 11:30 P.M., when in crossing the Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad tracks in the Town of Rockville the bus was struck 
by a Baltimore & Ohio passenger train traveling 58 or 59 
miles per hour. There were no flashing lights at the cross-
ing, but there· was a gong or crossing bell which was in 
operation at the time of the accident, and there was a red 
lantern which a. flagman had left burning there. The plain-
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tiff's testimony as to lack of signals both at the crossing 
and from the train \Vas all negative, and the Maryland Ap.. 
pellate Court said that in the face of positive· testimony 
to the contrary, it did not even raise a question for the 
jury. It was raining at the time of the accident, but the 
Appellate ~Court said that if the driver had stopped he 
would have been able to hear the signals. 
With respect to the speed of the train the Maryland 
Appellate ·Court referred to the fact that there were auto-
matic bells ringing at the crossing, plus the whistle on the 
locomotive which was sounded and the locomoti~e bell 
which was ringing, and the court said: 
"* * * All these precautions were taken and 
all these warnings were given at the time of the 
accident, and they furnished adequate and oppor-
tune warnings of approaching trains, no matter 
their speed. The crossing was one where a traveler 
would anticipate the passage of fast trains. It fol-
lows that, under these circumstances, a recovery can-
not be had on the speed of the train. (Cases cited.)" 
(Italics ours.) 
In Plough v. Baltimore & Ohio, R. Co., 172 F'. 2d 396·, 
the Federal Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit reversed 
the trial court for submitting' an instruction to a jury which 
· · · · allowed the jury to find the railroad company guilty of 
negligence on the question of speed alone when there was 
no statutory regulation as to speed and where the question 
of speed was not tied in with the failure to give proper 
signals. 
In the case at bar there is no dispute as, to proper 
signals having been given from the train. In addition to 
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that fact the crossing was protected by a wigwag contain-
ing a. swinging light and a bell, yet the court by Instruc-
tion No. 10 allowed the jury to find the defendant negligent 
regardless of warnings and signals even though the jury 
should find that the speed of the train was not in excess 
of 30 miles an hour and therefore not in violation of any 
law or ordinance. 
The pictures, Exhibits 3, 6 and G, show that while this 
crossing is in the edge of Cokeville it also borders on coun-
try area, and with the wigwag protecting the crossing could 
be considered similar to an ordinary country crossing. 
In Canion v. Southern Pac. Co., (Ariz.) 80 P. 2d 397, 
with res.pect to a charge of excess speed, the court stated: 
"* * * It is too well known for us to refuse 
to take judicial notice of the fact that trains of this 
nature are universally scheduled to travel at a high 
rate of speed, and partciularly so in sparsely settled 
and outlying country districts. If such speed in such 
districts were of itself negligence, there can be no 
doubt that the various railroad commissions, which 
are so zealous in guarding the rights of the public, 
would have prohibited a speed so universally em-
ployed. We are clearly of the opinion that the ad-
mitted speed of the train at the time and under the 
·circumstances was not, as a matter of law, negli-
gence unless it were shown affirmatively that there 
were some circumstances existing at the time which 
should have caused the engineer to slacken his speed. 
There was no evidence of this nature." 
The testimony in the case at bar shows that Cokeville 
had a population of approximately 500 people (R. 195), 
and in the main, people who went back and forth over the 
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~crossing were ranchers. The witness Harmon stated that 
~approximately half of the people of Cokeville lived to the 
~west of the crossing, but the pictures above referred to 
: show the contrary and show that the crossing is. in the 
~extreme west edge of town. 
In the case of Nice v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., (Ill.) 25 N. 
E. 2d 10~, the accident occurred in the Village of Chestnut, 
~Illinois, which contained about 300 people. In that case 
::the train was going 90 miles an hour, and with respect to 
rng~ a charge of exceed speed, and in holding the driver of the 
~vehicle involved to have been guilty of negligence as a mat-
. ter of law, the Illinois Appellate Court stated: 
h 
..... 
r.~ "It is hard for this Court to see in this day and 
age, and under the circumstances proven in this 
~ 1 ~ case, how it can determine that it is negligence per 
se to operate a train at the rate of 90 miles per hour 
through the Village of Chestnut." 
... - See also Carter v. Pennsylvamia R. Co., (Sixth Circuit 
-~_Ct. of App.) 172 F. 2d 521. 
_ _. It was prejudicial and reversible error for the court 
~~-under the facts shown by the record in this case to allow 
~;the jury to find the defendant guilty of negligence if it 
~~ ~r operated the train over the crossing at 30 miles an hour. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMIT-TING 
TO T·HE JURY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER 
OR NOT THE DEFENDANT ADEQUATELY 
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WARNED T1RAVELERS ON THE HIGHWAY 
AP~PROA~C·HING OR INTENDTNG TO USE THE 
FIRST STREET CROSSING. (Statement of Er-
rors Nos. 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13.) 
There is no dispute in the evidence in this case with 
respect to the warnings which were actually given and 
t:qere is not sufficient in the record from which the jury 
could have found otherwise than that the whistle on the 
Streamliner passenger train was sounding almost contin-
uously as it approached the crossing, the bell on the Stream-
liner was operating, and the wigwag was. swinging back-
and-forth with the light in the center on red and the bell 
in the mechanism ringing. In addition, the freight train 
standing south of the crossing sounded one or more blasts 
of its whistle. WE REPEA~J\ THIS ~EVIDENCE IS NOT 
CONTRADICTED. There were some of the witnesses who 
did not hear the bell on the Streamliner engine, but none 
attempted to say that it did not ring. N·ot all of the wit-
nesses heard all of the whistles on the Streamliner, but 
several-both of plaintiff's and defendant's. witnesses-tes-
tified to hearing several whistles from the Streamliner. 
Even the witness Mr. Harmon, who saw the· Streamliner 
momentarily and attempted to judge its speed, did not 
sa.y that the Streamliner had not whistled. In the face of 
this evidence, there was no basis whatsoever for the court 
to submit to the jury any question as to whether or not 
the defendant had "adequately warned" drivers of motor 
vehicles of the approach of said train. 
It was not at any time claimed that railroad traffic 
over the crossing was excess, and in fact the amount of 
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~railroad traffic over the crossing was not shown at all. 
...... 
. . It was alleged in the complaint that First Street carried a 
I•' 
... large amount of vehicular traffic, but the only testimony 
with respect to that wa~ that 10 or 15 vehicles. an hour 
~ passed back-and-forth over the crossing (R. 201). This 
~would mean approximately only one vehicle in five minutes. 
'-
-.: 
We have already referred to the fact that there were 
-~- no industries surrounding the crossing which would create 
-__ any noise, and there were no facts in evidence which would 
~n tend to indicate that the Streamliner whistle could not or 
~ 
i~ would not have been heard had Toomer only stopped to 
·~-listen. Clearly, there could not by any stretch of the imagi-
. nation be anything gleaned from the records in this case 
-:·as to why Toomer did not or could not have seen or heard 
:::.:the wigwag signal at the crossing. If there had been any 
~~dispute in the evidence concerning the wigwag or bell at 
___ the crossing, or if there had been any dispute concerning 
-.·-·signals that were given by the Streamliner engine, then 
~the question might have been different and might possibly 
~have been submitted to the jury. 
,--:: 
__ , 
,""; 
.-- The question of signals or warnings in addition to 
:e:those usually given is only material when the crossing is 
:==·alleged to be and there is proof that it is an exceptionally 
if:or unusually dangerous one, and where the normal warn-
:;; ings usually given at a crossing would be difficult to be 
~:heard by a person using due care, but where there is neither_ 
pleadings nor proof to that effect and it is shown that in 
ih': addition to normal signals a wigwag light and bell is in 
:~toperation at the crossing, such warnings are a's a matter 
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of law sufficient, and submitting the question of additional 
warnings, or allowing the jury to speculate concerning ad-
ditional warnings, constitutes prejudicial error. 
As was said in the case of State v. Poe et al., (Md.) 190 
A. 2,31, supra, "All these precautions. were taken and all ~ 
these warnings were given at the time of the accident,~~ 
and they furnished adequate and opportune warnings of i 
arpproa.ching· trains, no matter their speed." (Italics ours.) 
In the case of Markar v. New York, N .. H. & H. R. Co., 1 
77 F. 2d 283, a crossing collision occurred after dark. It 
was shown that there were no obstructions to view and · 
in daylight one approaching the track could see along it 
for 1,000 feet. However, the accident happened after dark : 
and it was claimed that the train had no headlight and 
did not ring a bell or sound a whistle; also that the train 
was running at excessive speed. In addition to these claims, 
it was charged that the crossing was extra-hazardous and 
was not adequately protected. It appeared in evidence that 1 
there were flasher lights on one side of the highway only, 
1 
although having lights facing in each direction along the 
highway. There was no bell at the crossing. The trial court 
submitted the case to a jury, which returned a verdict for 
plaintiff. The F'ederal ·Court of Appeals reversed the trial ! 
court stating: "It was error to permit the jury to find 
negligence based upon an insufficiently protected cross-
ing." We quote the following from the opinion: 
"Appellant complains that the court should not 
have permitted the jury to find as an element of: 
negligence that the crossing was insufficiently pro-
tected. The blinker at the crossing was installed in 
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19'23 pursuant to the order of the Commission, and 
the appellees claim that while it might have been 
sufficient at that time, with the increase in traffic 
over this highway it was insufficient at the time of 
the accident. The highway is a main route and a 
short cut to Hartford, New Haven, and shore points, 
and was a road used by four bus lines and many 
school buses. It was contended by the appellees that 
appellant should have known that motorists are often 
behind large trucks, as appellees were at the time 
in question, thus making it impossible to see the 
light on the blinker at the right-hand. side of the 
highway, and that there should have been another 
blinker on the opposite side as they proceeded. In 
other words, that on a much traveled highway re-
sulting in a dangerous crossing, blinker lights on 
both sides of the highway, or in the middle of the 
highway, or at a greater height above the highway, 
might be found to be necessary by a jury, or that an 
electric warning bell, flagman, or gates were neces-
sary. The proof upon the trial may be supplemented 
sufficiently to indicate heavy traffic and such use 
of the highway as to permit a jury to find an ex-
tra..:hazardous crossing requiring a higher degree of 
protection, either by means of an electric bell, gates., 
or flagman. (Citing cases.) But the present rec-ord 
does not justify such a finding. * * * (Italics 
ours.) 
"There passed over this single-track crossing, 
eight schedule trains a day. It was located in the 
country, three miles from the city of Willimantic. 
Approaching the track, the traveler had no obstruc-
tion and could see in either direction a distance of 
1,000 feet. In the cases we have referred to, there 
was some obstruction to vision. Moreover, the amount 
of travel over this crossing, as disclosed by evidence, 
is indefinite and would not permit a jury to find 
that more protection was necessary than that which 
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.concededly existed at the crossing. It is estimated 
that traffic increased 15 per cent over that which 
prevailed when the Public Service Commission is-
sued its order as to signals at the crossing. What 
it was then or what it is now, was not proved. It 
was error to permit the jury to find negligence based 
upon an insufficiently protec'ted crossing." (Italics 
ours.) 1 
In the case at bar we are told that ·Cokeville had only 
500 inhabitants, and this apparently included the· ranchers 
in the outlying districts. There were no near centers of 
large population such as Hartford or New Haven. The evi-
dence as to travel showed that it was not nearly so great as 
' in the Markar case, in which the court said that with proper 
evidence it could be shown that additional protection was 
needed, "but the present record does not justify such a 
finding." 
In the case of Schaffer v. New Yor-k Cent. R. Co., 
(Ohio) 34 N. E. 2d 792, a train _traveling 50 to 55 miles 
per hour came around a curve 500 feet from the crossing. 
There was at the crossing the regular crossarm sign, and 
in addition, automatic flasher lights, which. were operating 
at the time of the accident. It was contended that the rail-
road should have provided a watchman or gates., or other 
more effective warning. The trial court directed a verdict 
for the defendant, and the Ohio Appellate Court in affirm-
ing the judgment said : 
"So far as this record shows, the defendant had 
provided all of the warning and signaling devices at 
this crossing the law required. Having provided the 
cross sign and the flashers, did ordinary care require 
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more? Certainly not as to the decedent. The flash-
ers told the driver and occupants of the Gee auto 
that they were at a railroad crossing, and, with the 
\ 
whistle, that a train was approaching. A watchman 
or gates could have furnished them no more infor-
mation. 
"In respect to signs or signals at the crossing 
and warnings from the locomotive, negligence of the 
defendant was not proven. 
* * * * * 
"* * * 'Varning signs and signals such as 
existed at this time and place having been provided, 
those operating that train were warranted in as-
suming that the traveling public, having been in-
formed of its approach, would yield to it the right 
of way over the crossing. If this is not true and 
such a train must keep its speed where it can be 
stopped in a few feet, the essential and practical 
purpose of railroads is lost." 
The Ohio Appellate Court held the decedent to have 
been bound by the warning that the automatic signal given 
and added: 
"* * * With this information, when he went 
upon the track he knew he was taking a chance and 
he did so at his own risk. As a matter of law he 
was guilty of negligence which either caused or 
contributed to cause the fatality." 
In subparagraph (f) of Instruction No. 13, the court 
instructed the jury that in determining whether the de-
fendant adequately warned users of the First Street ·cross-
ing of the approach of the train, they could consider whether 
.an ordinary prudent man under the circumstances and in 
the position of -John T. Toomer would have believed from 
the location and movement of the freight train that the 
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freight train and the freight train alone was activating the 
wigwag signal and was blowing all the whistles, if any, 
and sounding all the bells, if any, that could be heard. Such 
an instruction was error and highly prejudicial. The plain-
tiff attempted to produce testimony from one or more of 
his witnesses that they thought the wigwag would work 
when a train was on the side track (R. 117, 123., 124, 126). 
The court sustained objections to such testimony, and as a 
result the only evidence in the record is that the wigwag 
was not operated by trains on these side tracks and never 
had so operated it, and at least some of plaintiff's witnesses 
knew that these tracks were passing tracks and used for 
that purpose, and they were so stated in the complaint it-
self when filed (R. 2). Toomer had lived by the track for 
10 years. He may have had actual knowledge, as others. did, 
that the side tracks were used only for passing and that 
only main line trains activated ·the signal. At any rate, 
there is no evidence as to what he might have known or 
what he might have assumed. There was no evidence that 
there had ever been any excess opeTa tion of these signals. 
There was no testimony that anyone had ever seen the 
wigwag activated if nothing was on the main line. There 
was no evidence that trains were in the habit of standing 
with the lights operating continuously or tor any excess 
period of time. In spite of these facts and after the court 
had prohibited witnesses from testifying as to what their 
understanding or assumption might have been as to when 
the signals would work, the court nevertheless submittep 
this instruction to the jury and let the jury thereby and 
without any evidence whatsoever speculate on the question 
I 
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as to whether or not Toomer might have assumed that the 
freight train was activating the sig·nal. There was no basis 
in the evidence introduced in the case which would justify 
submission of any such instruction to the jury. This. al-
lowed the jury the wildest type of speculation without a 
scintilla of evidence to go on and was prejudicial error of 
the worst sort. 
In subparagraph (g) of Instruction No. 13, the court 
allowed the jury to speculate upon the question as to whether 
or not an ordinary prudent man in John T!oomer's posi-
tion would have believed there was sufficient time to safely 
cross all of the tracks. Such an instruction was not proper 
under the facts of this case. There was no testimony that 
Toomer knew how long the flasher light would operate and 
how long it would take for any train to reach the crossing 
or what he could base any question of time on, assuming 
time to cross the tracks, and in the face of evidence con-
cerning the wigwag signal it was highly improper because 
the law does not allow such a person to speculate or de-
termine whether he can cross the tracks safely without 
first stopping his vehicle in response to the warning. In-
structions must be applicable to the facts of the instant case, 
and the facts in the instant case were conclusive that the· 
wigwag signal was in operation. The statute which applied 
thereto set an absolute standard of conduct and that was 
that Toomer should have stopped and then not proceeded 
until he could have done so safely. If the evidence had 
s·hown that the light at the crossing had been working for 
some excessive period of time, and if the evidence had 
shown that Toomer stopped and waited and after a reason-
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able length of time proceeded cautiously over the tracks, 
then it may have been proper for the court to submit a 
question to the jury as to whether a reasonable man after 
stopping would have concluded that it was safe to cross. 
BUT SUCH AN INSTRU~CTION WAS NOT P·ROPER UN-
DER THE FA!CTS IN THE C'ASE AT BAR. 
If the evidence had shown that the wigwag signal had 
been in the habit of operating excessively or for long per-
iods of time when no traffic was moving, and if the evi-
dence had shown that as a result of such excessive ope·ration 
of the signal people generally had formed a habit of cross-
ing in spite of the signal, there might then have been a 
proper basis for the court to allow the jury to speculate as 
to whether a reasonable rna~ would have, under the pro-
visions of the statute, determined that it was safe to cross 
(although the Texas Court held it improper to submit it 
to a jury even under such circumstances in Texas & Pac. 
Ry. Co. v. Day, supra.) ; but under the facts of this case 
and the applicable statutes, Toomer was. bound to stop: and 
not to proceed until he could do so safely. The statute in 
effect said a reasonable person should stop and not proceed 
until he could do so safely, and it was prejudicial and re-
versible error for the court to allow the jury to find that 
Toomer acted as a reasonable man in violating a penal 
statute which set out, as this statute does, an absolute stan-
dard of care. 
The court instructed the jury that they could find 
defendant negligent for failing to adequately warn users 
of the First Street crossing if they found (h) lack of warn-
ing devices other than the wigwag, and in subparagraph 
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(i), if they found the lack of a watchman at the crossing. 
What evidence is there which would require "warning de-
vices other than the wigwag, the existence of the tracks, 
and the presence of the freight train?" · There is not one 
bit of evidence and no issue raised by the pleadings to show 
that this was an unusually hazardous crossing requiring 
other than normal signs erected at the crossing, and in spite 
of such lack of pleadings and evidence, it is undisputed that 
the defendant railroad company had nevertheless installed 
and maintained an electric wigwag s.ignal with a swinging 
red light and a bell, all of which were in operation. If there 
had not been such automatic protection at the crossing, the 
pleadings and evidence were not sufficient to show this to 
be an extra-hazardous crossing. The only thing unusual 
at the crossing at all was the presence of the freight train, 
which admittedly constituted some obstruction, but the 
wigwag was ample protection with respect to that, and ex-
cept for the freight train there was no obstruction to view. 
There was no excess traffic and no noise rendering ordinary 
signals indistinct or hard to hear, and there was nothing 
that under ordinary circumstances would require even the 
presence of a wigwag. The wigwag was there and it was 
there for the purpose· of warning travelers of trains ap-
proaching on the main line while trains might be located 
on the passing tracks. Again we say, there was no dispute 
as to proper signals having been given by the approaching 
train and no reason for Toomer not to have heard them 
had he listened. If the truck was making a noise, that did 
not excuse him and he could have stopped and lowered his 
windows. All this, disregarding the question of the wig-
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wag, which in and of itself was more than sufficient ad-
ditional warning. There was no justification in either plead-
ings or evidence to warrant the court in allowing the jury 
to speculate as to whether the railroad company should 
have furnished some "warning device connected with the 
crossing other than the· wigwag." Even a. f:lagm.an could 
not have given a more effective warning to an approach-
ing truck than a swinging disk with a red light and a warn-
ing bell. Had there been a flagman he more than likely 
would have had to get out of the way to keep from getting 
run over, as has been the case in some similar situations. 
As a concluding paragraph to Instruction 13, the court 
tells the jury; that if- t~ey find that an ordinary prudent 
careful person would not have been aware of the danger, 
then the defendant was negligent for not having adequately 
warned the deceased. The court says nothing about whether 
or not Toomer would have been guilty of contributory neg-
ligence under the ·circumstances, but infers that if the 
jury should find that he was not thus adequately warned, 
he would not have been guilty of negligence. 
There would have been much more justification for 
submitting such an instruction to a. jury in a. case like 
Nabrotsky v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 103 Utah 274, 135 
P. 2d 115; or in the case of Nuttall v. Denver & R. G. W. R. 
Co., 98 Utah 383, 99 P. 2d 15; or in the recent case of Frank 
v. McCarthy, 112 Utah 422, 188 P. 2d 737, where there was 
no mechanical signal at the crossing. The facts in the case 
at bar were stronger against the deceased Tbomer and 
would convict him of contributory negligence as a matter 
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of law to a greater degree than would be true in either of 
the three cases just cited, and under the circumstances there 
is and was no justification for the court to submit to the· 
jury the question as to whether or not Toomer as an or-
dinary prudent careful person should have been aware of 
the danger when the evidence '\Vas so overwhelming as to 
signals having been given and as to his lack of caution. 
The court by Instruction No. 13 disregarded the law 
that has been set forth by this court in many of its cases, 
as well as by other courts, to the effect that "what con-
stitutes ordinary care under such circumstances, or, as it is 
sometimes termed, 'the measure of duty,' is pre~cribed by 
law, and therefore is not left to the whim or caprice of 
either court of jury'' (Butler v. Payne, 5·9 Utah 383:, 203 
P. 869). By such an instruction the court left it to the jury 
to decide according to its own whim what conduct should 
or should not constitute negligence, regardless of statute 
and regardless of what the law might otherwise be. The 
statute applicable in this case set an absolute standard of 
conduct. Because others may have violated the law the 
court cannot say that Toomer would be relieved of the re-
sulting consequences if he violated it. The statute said he 
must stop and not proceed until he can do so safely, and 
where the evidence conclusively shows he did not stop and 
that he did not even proceed cautiously, it is prejudicial 
and reversible error for the court to so allow the jury to 
speculate on whether a reasonable person would have so 
violated the law and on such basis excuse Toomei_' for doing 
so. If such an instruction would ever be proper, it would 
have to be based upon some evidence showing operation of 
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the signal in question in such a manner that it could not 
be relied upon. There would have to be some evidence that 
people in the vicinity, including the deceased, knew of the 
unreliability of the signal, and there would have to be some 
evidence showing that Toomer had at least stopped and 
then proceeded cautiously over the crossing. In absence 
of any such evidence, the only conclusion that could prop-
erly be reached from the record in this case is that the 
statute set an absolute standard by which all men must be 
guided and controlled, and if they fall short of the standard 
thus set, they must know that they would suffer a crim-
inal penalty and any other attendant consequences. 
In Instruction No. 12 the court allowed the jury to 
find the defendant negligent if an ordinary prudent en-
gineer would not have driven an engine onto the crossing 
at a speed as great as 30 miles an hour even though he had 
in all respects complied with the law. Here again the court 
disregarded standards of care which have been set by this 
and other courts with respect to the operation of such 
trains. ,C'ourts, have repeatedly said that engineers or others 
in the operation of trains, even if they see vehicles approach- · 
ing, do not need to slow down or stop the trains but are 
entitled to assume that approaching vehicles will comply 
with the law and stop and give way to the approaching 
train. The trial court under such circumstances, with an 
open crossing, would have instructed the jury, not that 
the engineer would be entitled to so assume, but that the 
jury could by their own whim or caprice decide whether 
a reasonable engineer would or would not stop. The law 
has been definitely set to the contrary. 
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In the case of Lang v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., (Wis.) 
40 N. W. 2d 548, where there were box ears placed near the 
street at the crossing, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
stated that the railroad employes had a right to assum.e 
that persons driving a truck over the intersection would 
obey the statutory command and stop not less than 20 or 
more than 40 feet from the crossing. 
In the case of New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. Powell, (Ind.) 
47 N. E. 2d 615, the court said: 
"* * * It must have been the legislative con-
clusion that, of course, all travelers would take notice 
of the warning afforded by mechanical signals." 
In the giving of Instructions Nos. 10, 12:, 13 and 23-, 
the court disregarded standards of care which have been 
set in railroad cases for years past and allowed the jury 
to speculate and set up, according to their own whim or 
caprice, what they would think a standard of eare should 
be in this particular case, in spite of the fact_ and in face 
of the fact that there was a direct statute applicable to the 
facts of the case which set an absolute standard of care 
and provided a criminal penalty for violation. In doing so 
the court committed prejudicial and reversible error and 
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL 'COURT ERRED IN INSTIRUCT-
ING THE JUR.Y THAT THERE WAS A PRE-
SUMPTION THAT T'OOMER WAS IN THE EX-
ERCISE OF ORDINARY CARE IMMEDIAT'ELY 
PRIOR TO THE TIME OF T'HE COLLISION. 
(Statement of Error No. 14.) 
There is no presumption of due care on the part of a 
deceased when the only evidence in the case shows con-
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elusively that the deceased was not in the exercise of due 
care. Such a presumption is. available in the absence of 
evidence showing what may have been done by the· deceased 
or what care may have been exercised by him. It is a pre-
sumption induJged in in the absence of evidence. But where 
there is evidence in a case as to the actions of the deceased 
or the amount of care exercised by him, then there is no 
presumption operative and it is error on the part of the 
court to instruct the jury that there is such a presumption 
when the evidence shows to the contrary. 
This rule has been recently and effectively stated by 
this court in the case of King v. D-enver & Rio· Grande 
Western R. Co., ______ Utah ______ , 211 P. 2d 833. In that case 
a brakeman riding a car on a flying switch was killed, and 
on appeal it was contended it would be presumed that the 
deceased was engaged in the performance of his duties and 
in the exercise of due care. 
In the performance of his duties and exercising due 
care, the deceased would have been obligated to manipulate 
the brake upon the moving car. He was not in view of 
witnesses all the time, but at no ~ime was he seen to be 
operating or attempting to operate the brake, and with 
respect to this presumption this court said : 
"The presumption that Thomas was engaged in 
the performance of his duties and in the exercise 
of due care for his own safety at the time of his 
death has not come into being because the evidence 
that Thomas at every point where observed, was 
making no attempt to apply the brake until within 
fifty feet of the end of the bin. At that time it was 
too late to stop the cars in the remaining distance 
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even if the brake were in perfect working order. 
* * *" 
In the case of Whiffin v. Union Pac. R. Co. et al., 
(Idaho) 89 P. 2d 540, in connection with the question of 
this presumption, the Idaho court, quoting an earlier case 
with approval, stated: 
"The respondent relies largely upon an indul· 
gence of the presumption that the jury was at lib-
erty to infer ordinary care and diligence on the part 
of the decedent from all of the circumstances of the 
case-his character and habits and the natural in-
stincts of self-preservation-to hold the verdict. This 
can only be done in the absence of direct proof of 
the facts. 111e circumstances of the case alone are 
sufficient to rebut the presumption invoked. * * *" 
POINT V 
UNDER THE EVIDENCE IN TffiS CASE T'HE 
SPEED OF THE STREAMLIN·ER TRAIN WAS 
NOT A PROXIMAT'E CAUSE OF T'HE AC~CI­
DENT AND THE ·C·OURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO .. 4. (Statement of Error No. 
15.) 
There is no evidence in the case that the deceased ever 
saw the Streamliner train in question. It is clear that he 
could not at any time have observed it so as to appraise 
,its speed. If he heard the signals but nevertheless assumed 
that he would have time to get across, he would be guilty 
thereby of contributory negligence without question. 
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In the case of Vance v. Union Pac. R. Ca., (Kan.) 298 
P. 765, the trial court granted a nonsuit, or rather, sus-
tained a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence. The train in 
question was operated at 20 miles, an hour, whereas a city 
ordinance pTovided a speed limit for trains of 10 miles an 
hour. The Supreme Court of Kansas in affirming the trial 
court stated: 
"We think the court was warranted in sustain-
ing the demurrer to plaintiff's evidence. The only 
negligence shown, and apparently the only one upon 
which plaintiff relies or has any ground to rely 
upon, is that the train was running at a speed in 
excess of that prescribed in the city ordinance. It 
is a well-established rule of law that the violation 
of a city ordinance regulating the rate of speed of 
trains within a city imposes no liability on the rail-
road company for an injury to others unless the 
violation was the efficient or proximate cause of the 
injury. * * * 
* * * * • 
"In regard to the excessive speed of the train, 
it appears that, when the engineer discovered that 
the driver was recklessly driving upon the track, 
he used all appliances and care to a vert the collision, 
and it further appears that, even if the railroad 
train had been running at a ten-mile rate, the speed 
permitted by the city ordinance, the collision would 
have occurred due to the situation at the time, and 
the negligent approach to the crossing by the driver. 
* * *" 
It cannot be said that if the train had been going only 
30 miles an hour when Toomer drove in front of it he would 
not have been killed. Such a fatality is just as probable 
and as much a matter of common experience when a train 
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may be traveling 40, 50 or 60 miles an hour. The speed of 
the train was only a condition present, and the· proximate 
cause was Toomer's driving in front of the train at the 
time and place. 
This court recognized such a rule in Horsley v. Rob-
inson et a.l., 112 Utah 227, 186 P. 2d 592. In that case it 
was charged that defendant's bus was traveling too fast. 
This court said: 
"The mere happening of the accident of course 
does not prove that the defendants were negligent. 
Nor does the fact that the rate of speed at which 
they traveled brought them at the s.cene of the acci-
dent at the time the Reinhardt car went out of con-
trol and into the course of travel of the bus, becaus,e 
that is something that they could not anticipate and 
guard against. * * *" 
Had it been the occupant of the Reinhardt car involved 
in the action, the court would thus have concluded that the 
speed of the bus was not the proximate cause of the collision. 
However, suit was by a passenger on the bus, and this court 
held: 
"* * * Of course, if this bus had been trav-
eling at the rate of 5 miles per hour the collision with 
the Reinhardt car would not have injured the plain-
tiff because at that rate the bus being driven against 
a small car moving in the same direction would not 
create sufficient jar to injure the passengers. 
* * *" 
The situation was different in the ·case at bar and a 
speed of 30 miles per hour within the city ordinance limit 
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would have made no difference as far as Toomer's injuries 
and death were concerned. 
In O'Malley v. Eagan et al., (Wyo.) 2: P. 2d 1063~, cited 
by this court in Horsley v. Robinson, it was stated: 
"Speed, considered by itself, cannot, accordingly, 
be said to have necessarily contributed to the acci .. 
dent in question. That is clear when we bear in 
mind that if the defendant had traveled at a lawful 
rate of speed, but had started a few minutes earlier, 
he would have been at the place of accident just the 
same. The speed, therefore, eonsidered by itself, may 
have been merely a condition of the accident, and 
remote in the chain of causation, from which no lia .. 
bility arose. * * *" 
See also Whalen v. Dunbar et al., (R. 1.) 115· A. 718, 
wherein the Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated: 
"* * * If it should be conceded that the de-
fendant's ·automobile at the time the emergency was 
created was proceeding at a rate of speed in excess 
of the statutory limit, there was no testimony of 
probative value showing or tending to show that the 
accident would not have happened if the defendant's 
automobile had been proceeding at the rate of 2~ 
miles per hour, or even at a much less rate of speed, 
or th~t the speed of the defendant's automobile in 
any way entered into the cause of the collision. 
"As the speed of the defendant's automobile in 
no wise contributed to the accident, the rate of speed 
is immaterial, and liability cannot be predicated 
upon the speed of said automobile. (Cases cited.)" 
In Lynch v. Pennsylvania R. Co. et al., (Ohio) 194 N. E. 
31, the deceased approached the crossing at 25 to 35 miles 
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per hour. There was an automatic crossing bell maintained 
at the crossing by the railroad company, and it was ring-
ing and the locomotive whistle was sounded. There was 
a watchman on the far side of the crossing and he gave 
no signal to either stop or proceed. It was contended that 
the inaction of the watchman amounted to an invitation to 
proceed. A city ordinance limited the speed of trains to 
10 miles per hour, and the train was exceeding that speed. 
Deceased did not attempt to slow down until 25 feet from 
the crossing, and then, seeing the train, skidded on the oiled 
street and collided with the engine. The trial court directed 
a verdict for the defendant and the Ohio Appellate 'Court 
affirmed the trial court stating : 
"Now it is claimed that the railroad company 
was negligent in operating the locomotive at a speed 
greater than 10 miles an hour, as provided in the 
ordinances of the city. This excess of speed, which 
was stated to be about 20 miles per hour, could not 
have been the proximate cause of the death of the. 
decedent.'' 
In the case of Whiffin v. Union Pac. R. Co. et al., (Ida-
ho) 89 P. 2d 540, wherein the plaintiff had pleaded the facts 
rather fully, the trial court sustained a general demurrer 
and the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the trial court. \ 
The deceased had driven over a double track in the 'City 
,of Caldwell in the face of an automatic wigwag and lights. 
She had stopped for a .:passing freight train going one di-
rection and started immediately· as the freight passed and 
was struck by a passenger train going in the other direc-
tion on the next track. She assumed the operation of the 
flashing lights was caused by the departing freight, and 
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it was alleged that a flagman or gates should have been 
provided. It was also charged that the passenger train was 
passing at an excessive speed, greatly in excess of the 25 
miles an hour provided by the ·City of Caldwell. The Idaho 
Supreme Court wrote an exhaustive opinion citing cases 
not only from the Idaho courts but from other states. The 
court gave an interesting discussion of the question of 
contributory negligence emphasizing the duty to ·observe 
caution and to look and listen in such a way as to make 
looking and listening effective. 
On the question of the speed of the train in excess of 
the ordinance limit the Idaho Supreme Court said: 
"The speed of the train, though in excess and 
therefore in violation of the ordinance, is not shown 
to have 'been as such, a proximate cause of the acci-
dent, because it is alleged deceased did not know 
of the approach of the passenger train, hence per-
force she did not rely on its approach at a legal 
speed permitting her to cross in front of it, and 
the rule in Fleenor v. Short Line R. 'Co., supra, does 
not assist the complaint. Nor are facts alleged 
which show that if the train had traveled at a legal 
rate, the accident would not have happened at all, 
or deceased been merely injured and not killed. No 
allegation states the distance of the city limits east 
of the crossing, how fast the passenger train was 
going, the exact relative position of the west end 
of the caboose on the freight train and front of pas.. 
senger engine and consequent increasingly clear 
angle of vision to deceased before and as she started 
onto the north, middle or south track, and thus any 
attempt to determine how the speed as such con-
tributed to the accident by considering the applica-
tion of any analysis of the above essentials absent 
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from the complaint, or that a less speed would not 
have killed deceased, leads to mere speculation and 
conjecture. (Cases cited.) 
"Deceased's negligence as contributing to the 
accident must be considered in the light of the cir-
cumstances as they existed, not as they might have 
been, so likewise must the speed of the passenger 
train, so far as the present complaint is concerned. 
Henderson v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. ~co., 314 
Mo. 414, 284 S. W. 788, 793." 
The plaintiff on appeal argued: 
"'If the train had not been running at an un-
lawful rate of speed, her life would have been 
spared.'" 
But the Idaho Supreme Court answered: 
"This is mere assertion, not argument or ex-
planation. Death resulted because deceased most 
unfortunately drove her car in front of this. train, 
which had a right to be on the track, and could have 
traveled no other place, which being at that point, 
at that time, could not have helped but strike de-
ceased, and when she had herself proceeded to the 
place of danger. * * * '' 
See also Holtkamp v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., CM:o.) 
234 s. w. 1054. 
The trial court erred in refusing to give defendant~s 
requested Instruction No. 4. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S INSTRUCTION NO. 
5 AS REQUESTED BECAUSE THE CROSS-
ING WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE UNUSUALLY 
HAZARDOUS. (Statement of Error No. 16.) 
We have already referred to the fact that the pleadings 
and evidence are wanting in showing hazards at this cross-
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ing which would warrant additional protection or additional 
warnings. The case which is cited most and has been cited 
by nearly all jurisdictions over the country with respect to 
hazardous crossing is the case of 'Grand Trunk Railway 
Company v. lves, 144 U. S. 408, 36 L. Ed. 485, 12 Sup. Ct. 
679. In that case the Supreme Court said: 
"* * * It seems, however, that before a jury 
will be warranted in saying, in the absence of any 
statutory direction to that effect, that a railroad 
company should keep a flagman or gates at a cross-
ing, it must be first shown that such crossing is 
more than ordinarily hazardous : as, for instance, 
that it is in a thickly populated portion of a town 
or city; or, that the view of the track is obstructed 
either by the company itself or by other objects 
proper in themselves; or, that the crossing is a much 
travelled one and the noise of approaching trains is 
rendered indistinct and the ordinary signals diffi-
cult to be heard by reason of bustle and confusion 
incident to railway or other business; or, by reason 
of some such like cause: and that a jury would not 
be warranted in saying that a railroad company 
should maintain those extra precautions at ordinary 
crossings in the country. * * *" 
In the case at bar the crossing was located in the edge 
of the Town of Cokeville, a town of no more than 500 popu-
lation. There were no cuts or curves in either the approach-
ing track or the highway. There were no close buildings, no 
manufacturing establishments or excess traffic that might 
create noise. There was no evidence of any switching what-
soever that might cause confusing situations as far as the 
passing tracks were concerned, nor even any evidence of 
any unusual amount of switching on the house track, which 
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was some distance to the east, and there was no evidence as 
to the movement of trains over the crossing. In spite of aU 
of this there was nevertheless the additional protection of 
a wig,vag and bell at the crossing. 
In the case of Erlvin v. Southern Pacific Co., (Ore.) 
95 P. 2d 62, the Supreme Court of Oregon stated: 
"There is no common law duty to provide a 
greater warning to negligent or unlawful drivers 
than to careful ones." 
In the case of New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. Powell, (Ind.) 
47 N. E. 2d 615, there were some obstructions to view ap- · 
proaching a crossing, and the crossing was in a residential 
section of a town of about 600 people. In reversing the trial 
court's judgment on the ground that P<;>well was guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law, and with re-
spect to the crossing, the Indiana Supreme Court said: 
"* * * There was no evidence of unusual 
noises calculated to interfere with hearing signals 
and warnings. There was the usual cross-arm rail-
road warning, which was visible for a reasonable 
distance to one approaching the railroad, and the 
railroad company had provided, in addition to the 
signals required by statute, an automatic electric 
bell to warn travelers of the approach of trains. 
* * * We are constrained to hold that, under 
such circumstances, due care did not require the 
railroad company to provide warning or signaling 
devices in addition to the statutory sigrials and the 
crossing bell referred to. * * *" 
In Bledsoe v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., (Kan.) 90 P. 
2d 9, it was argued that the crossing involved was an 
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unusually dangerous one. It was on a federal and state 
highway carrying especially heavy traffic. Large oil stor-
age tanks near the track obstructed the view. 
The trial court submitted the case to a jury, which re-
turned a verdict for plaintiff. The Kansas Supreme Court 
reversed the trial court and directed a judgment for defend-
ant, and on the question of a dangerous crossing the court 
said: 
"Plaintiffs further contend that whether a rail-
road crossing is unusually dangerous is a question of 
fact for the jury, * * * This is true only when 
there is substantial competent evidence that the 
crossing is unusually dangerous. Unless such evi-
dence is produced the question is one of law for the 
court. The authorities on this point do not go so far 
as to authorize allegations to be made respecting any 
railroad crossing to the effect that it is unusually 
dangerous, and because of such allegations to say 
that the question is one for the jury. Examining the 
evidence in this case we are unable to find anything 
that would justify a classification of the crossing in 
question as being unusually dangerous. The fact that 
it is on a paved federal and state highway and bears 
the principal vehicular traffic from one direction 
to or from a city is common, to a greater or less de--
gree, with respect to all such highways near all the 
- ·cities of the state, and as previously noted, the 
amount of traffic on the highway had nothing to 
do with the casualty since there was no other traffic 
nearby on the highway at the time. The fact that 
there were lights near by does not distinguish it 
from other highways leading into and near cities. 
The fact that the roadbed was two or three feet 
above the level of the valley does not render it un· 
usually dangerous. * * *" 
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See also Johnson v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Kan.) 143 P. 
2d 630. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS AS REQUESTED 
BY DEFENDANT WHICH WERE APPLIC-
ABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE AT BAR. 
(Statement of Errors Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21.) 
Appellant has gone to some length in arguing con-
cerning instructions as actually given by the court which 
were not applicable to the case, and we now want to refer 
the court to the fact that instructions were requested by 
defendant and refused by the court which were applicable 
to the facts that had been developed in the case and were 
in line with the standards of care which had been set by 
the courts-not only of this state-but of most of the states 
throughout the country. 
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 15 would have 
informed the jury that it was the responsibility of the de-
ceased Toomer to see and observe and listen to the wigwag 
signal and to heed its warning and stop. 
Instruction No. 21 would have told the jury that the 
obstruction to view which may have been created by the 
standing freight train did not lessen the caution required 
of Toomer, but when considered with the mechanical wig-
wag, imposed a higher degree of care and caution on him. 
Instruction No. 23 as requested would have told the 
jury that if by paying heed to the wigwag, and at least slow-
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ing his truck down if not stopping, Toomer could have seen 
the approaching train in time to save himself, then he would 
have been negligent. 1 
Instruction No. 25 again directed attention to the 
automatic wigwag and bell and told the jury that it was 
Toomer's responsibility to slow down or stop in, response 
thereto. 
If the court had given any of such requested instruc-
tions, the ju;ry would then have been informed more proper-
ly and appropriately than it was as to the duty and measure 
of care set by all of the cases, and which Toomer as a reason-
able man should have been held to comply with regardless of 
what a jury may conclude otherwise. 
Instruction No. 16 as requested referred to physical 
facts, and by measurements on Exhibit No. 1, it can be 
shown that if Toomer had paid any attention whatsoever 
to the crossing signal and slowed his truck down even though 
he did not stop it, and if he had proceeded cautiously over 
the tracks as he approached the main line track, with his 
truck at a slow rate of speed, he would have been able to 
see the approaching Streamliner train in time to have stop-
ped the truck and would have avoided a collision on the 
main line therewith. While the view afforded past the 
. freight may have been short, still with the wigwag oper-
ating, a greater responsibility rested on Toomer, and while 
we cannot admit that the court was justified in submitting 
the matter to a jury at all, in submitting it to the jury as 
he did, he submitted improper standards of care with which 
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to let the jury speculate and did not submit instructions 
requested which were proper under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL. (Statement of Error No. 22.) 
In connection with safety devices or mechanical signals 
which have been installed at crossings and which at a 
particular time fail to work, it has been held by numerous 
courts that a railroad company will not be permitted to en-
courage persons to relax their vigil concerning the dangers 
that lurk at railroad crossings by assuring them through 
the erection of such safety devices that the danger has been 
removed or minimized and at the same time hold them to 
the same degree of care as would be required if those de-
vices had not been provided. See Toschi v. Christian, (Cal.) 
149 P. 2d 848; Will v. Southern Pacific Co., (Cal.) 116 P. 2d 
44. Thus it has been held that a person may rely not wholly 
but to some extent on the silent bell or wigwag at a crossing. 
Drummond v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 111 Utah 289, 
177 P. 2d 903. If this be true and if this be considered a 
proper rule binding a railroad company to greater respon-
sibility merely because the signal or safety device has been 
installed but fails to work at a particular time, then the 
opposite should also be true and travelers should be held 
bound to obey a properly operating signal, and if a traveler 
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attempts to pass over a crossing in the face of a swinging 
wigwag, light and bell he should be held to do so at his peril 
and should be held guilty of negligence as a matter of law 
under such circumstances, regardless of whether there is 
any statute on the subject or not. Then when there is a 
statute providing a criminal penalty, as is true in the case 
at bar, the matter should not even be open to argument. 
We are having all too many cas.es over the country in 
general and he·re in Utah in particular where people are 
being killed or seriously injured because they attempt to 
pass over crossings in spite of warnings of crossing signals 
actually in operation at the time. The most tragic occur-
rence recently in the State of Utah was the one wherein six 
children were killed at a crossing in Kaysville, Utah, where 
an adult driving the car in which they were riding drove in 
front of a fast passenger train in the face of flasher lights 
then in operation. 
According to the 63rd Annual Report of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (1949) p. 115, we are told that dur-
ing the calendar year 1948 there occurred in the United 
States 3,543 accident in which automobiles collided with 
trains at grade crossings. These accidents caused the death 
of 1,612 persons and injuries to 4,255 others. In 50 of such 
accidents trains were derailed causing the death of 21 and 
injuries to 95 persons, 84 of those killed or injured in such 
derailments were rail passengers, or employes, or persons 
carried on trains under contract. Because of this alarming 
experience, which has not improved from year to year, the 
prevention of grade crossing accidents has become a major 
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problem not only for the railroads, but also for those in 
charge of traffic on the highways, and should also be of 
major concern to the courts-particularly the courts of 
last resort in any State. 
According to the 1948 statistical report of the Oregon 
Public Utilities Commission, during the 10-year period 
ended December 31, 1948 nearly one-third (30.87o) of the 
grade crossing accidents in the State of Oregon occurred 
at crossings protected by train actuated signals, wigwags 
or flashing lights, or by crossing watchmen. With respect 
to accidents at such signalized crossings during the 10-year 
period the Oregon Public Utilities Commission found that 
"Disregard of the signal, attempting to beat the train 
across, and inability to stop because of excess speed, are the 
causes given for most of the accidents at these locations." 
An experience similar to that of the State of Oregon could 
no doubt be shown for many other States and we doubt that 
Utah would show a better record. Even the job of crossing 
watchman has become a hazardous occupation. Many have 
been struck down by motorists whose lives they were try-
ing to save. Such a watchman, if employed by an inter-
state railroad, is subject to the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act and railroads have been required to pay damages re-
sulting from accidents in which such watchmen have been 
killed or injured by motorists whom they were trying to 
protect. See Eubanks v. Thompson, Receiver, 334 U. S. 
854, 68 S. Ct. 1497, 92 L. Ed. 1776, reversing Missouri Pac. 
R. Co. v. Eubanks, 207 S. W. 2d 610, 208 S. W. 2d 161. 
These considerations make it increasingly important 
that the degree of care required of motorists in approaching 
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grade crossings shall be defined as definitely as possible, 
publicized sufficiently so that it may be understood by all, 
and then enforced so far as practicable. 
Every experienced lawyer when he moves for a non-
suit or directed verdict senses the instinctive resistance of 
trial judges to take any trial case from the jury. We under-
stand and appreciate some of their reasons. But even con-
scientious judges, by undue restraint lest they invade the 
jury's domain, may surrender functions which belong to 
the courts. The practical effect in such instances is to let 
juries, to a considerable extent at least, write their own 
law for the particular case. 
By instructing the jury as he did in Instructions 10, 
12, 13 and 23, the trial court herein very definitely let the 
jury write their own law and set their own standard~ of 
care for this case. 
If instructions as given by the court herein were per-
mitted to stand and to be given in other cases, then each 
jury would be free to evolve its own law of negligence for 
the particular case. Believing himself .. to be a reasonably 
prudent person the notions o{ each juror would become the 
only rules of law he could be expected to apply. He could 
decide that any human conduct whatsoever, though entirely 
lawful otherwise, constituted negligence for the purposes of 
the particular case. Conversely, he could decide that most 
any sort of conduct, though dangerous to others, violated 
no legal duty to them. He could by being thus unlimited in 
his decisions as to what a reasonable man might in his 
. opinion do, overrule de·cisions of this court with respect to 
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standards required of all men as have been set and re-
affirmed in cases like Wilkinson v. Oregon Short LineR. Co., 
35 Utah 110, 99 P. 466; Butler v. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203 
P. 869: Sho'rtino v. Salt Lake & Utah R. R., 52 Utah 476, 
174 P. 860; Nuttall v. D. & R. G. W. R. Co., 98 Utah 383, 99 
P. 2d 15; Nabrotzky v. Salt Lake & Utah R. Co., 103 Utah 
274, 135 P. 2d 115; and Drummond v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Company, 111 Utah 289, 177 P. 2d 903. 
With reference to railroad cases particularly, exact 
standards of care considered to be a minimum, regardless 
of what a jury might decide, have been set by this and other 
courts, and with the horrible experience of increasing aG-
cidents these standards should not be relaxed; particularly 
where a standard is set by legislative mandate it should be 
strictly adhered to. Any other policy would do nothing but . 
encourage travelers on a highway to relax their care and 
caution and accidents would increase still more. 
One of our Third District Court judges who IS now 
aspiring to become a member of this court was recently 
quoted ip an editorial in the Salt Lake Telegram (March 
31, 1950) as saying there was too much "hocus-pocus" and 
"voodooism" in the law and. that many a layman has be-
come confused and bewildered because of "legalistic pro-
fundities." Be this criticism right or wrong, the courts · 
should adhere to and make more pronounced, if possible, 
the standards to which a highway traveler should be bound 
so that a layman would know what his responsibility is. 
If a court could submit questions to a jury to let the 
jury speculate on the question as to whether a reasonable 
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man driving a vehicle would enter on a crossing in face of 
a lighted, moving and sounding signal, with nothing more 
than that being shown, and in face of a statute prohibiting 
it and in spite of the uncontradicted evidence, as shown in 
the instant case, that the driver of the vehicle did not even 
slow down, and if such should be adopted as a proper rule, 
WHAT THEN COULD LAYMEN EXPECT? What could 
attorneys advise as to any standard of care required of all 
men, upon which standard reasonable minds should not 
differ? Under such circumstances we would have to advise 
laymen, officials, railroad employes and operatives, and 
all alike, and we would have to say to them : "Just what 
you are really expected to do we cannot say, but that will 
be determined by some future jury after you have had an 
accident, which jury will then be allowed to decide on their 
own as to whether or not they think you acted as a reason-
able man." 
As early as the Wilkinson case, supra, if not earlier, 
this court stated that certain standards must be met re-
gardless of what a jury might find and without passing the 
rna tter to a jury where the facts are admitted, or not in 
dispute. In that case this court said that the law as gen-
erally adopted and applied by courts in this country was: 
"When one approaches a point upon a highway 
where a railroad track is crossed upon the same 
level it is his plain duty to proceed with caution, and 
if he attempts to cross the track, either on foot or in 
vehicle of /any description, he must exercise in so 
doing what the law regards as ordinary care under 
the circumstances. He must assume that there· is 
danger, and act with ordinary prudence and circum· 
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spection on that assumption. The requirements of 
the law, moreover, proceed beyond the featureless 
generality that one must do his duty in this respect, 
or must exercise ordinary care under the circum-
stances. The la~v defines precisely ~vkat the term 
'ordina.ry ca-re under the circumstances' shall mean 
in these cases. In the progress of the law in this 
behalf the question of care at railw'ay crossings, as 
affecting the tra.veler, is no longer, as a rule, a ques-
tion fo1· the jury. The quantum of care is exactly 
prescribed as a matter of law. In attempting to cross 
the tra,veler must listen for signals, notice signs put 
u,p as ~varnings, and look attentively up and down 
the track." (Italics ours.) 
These standards have long been adhered to but litigants 
and zealous attorneys have tried to force their relaxation 
to enable them to play upon the minds of sympathetic jur-
ors, and protections afforded by the railroad companies 
have many times been stated to be only a minimum and 
courts have let the jury decide if more were needed. It 
has not been difficult to figure out some new and extra-
ordinary obligation which, if performed by the railroad, 
might have insured a particular driver against his own 
carelessness. And experience reminds us that the maximum 
precaution which an ingenious litigant can suggest today 
may eventually become the minimum which some future 
jury may impose. 
We ask the court to look at this case from the stand-
point of its ultimate effect upon the railroads and the public 
generally so that by the pronouncement of this court the 
public may know whether or not they must pay any atten-
tion to warning signal devices erected at crossings, and so 
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that railroads may likewise know whether it is worthwhile 
in any event to erect such signalling devices in an effort 
to give further protection to the public. 
The question as to whether or not adequate warning of 
the approach of, the train herein had been given under the 
facts in this case should have been determined as a matter 
of law by the court and not submitted to the jury. The 
question of ·whether it was negligence for the engineer to 
enter the crossing at thirty miles per hour with all the 
warnings given, as shown by the record, on the basis. of 
whether such warnings were adequate, should have been 
decided as a rna tter of law by the court and not submitted 
to the jury. With the evidence uncontradicted that the wig-
wag, light and bell were all in operation at the time and 
that T'oomer without exercising any caution at all and in 
violation of statutory law applicable thereto approached 
and ·passed over the crossing at 25 to 30 miles per hour, 
without having at any time stopped or slowed down, the 
court should have determined that he was guilty of negli-
gence as a rna tter of law and should have directed a verdict 
for the defendant. Having failed to do so, this court should 
reverse the trial court and direct such verdict for the defen-
dant. 
By holding T'oomer guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law and reversing the trial court on the basis. that such 
tnal court should have granted the directed verdict, this 
court will not be creating new law (in spite of the fact 
that the majority of law concerning negligence in tort cases 
was originally court-made law rather than law established 
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by any legislature). By so reversing the trial court and 
directing a verdict in favor of the defendant this court 
will only be affirming a standard heretofore set by the 
courts in the first instance and finally adopted as an ab-
solute standard by legislative fiat. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
judgment should be entered for the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
_HOWARD F. CORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Counsel for Defendant 
and AppeUant. 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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